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TORT LAW IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE, KATRINA, AND 9/11:  EXPLORING 
LIABILITY FOR EXTRAORDINARY RISKS 
Daniel A. Farber∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Tort cases generally deal with routine risks—the kind of risk that a 
person encounters as a result of driving a car or buying a product.  Such 
risks are also staples of the insurance industry.  Today, however, society 
faces risks that threaten potentially massive harms to large segments of 
the public.  Katrina destroyed the city of New Orleans, claiming 1,464 
victims1 and causing well over $22.6 billion2 in property damage.  Much 
of the damage might have been avoided if the city’s flood control system 
had performed as designed.  A few years earlier, terrorist attacks on 9/11 
destroyed the World Trade Center, claiming 2,752 victims3 and causing 
over $18.8 billion4 in property damage.  Climate change may already be 
responsible for tens of thousands of deaths and will ultimately cause 
many billions of dollars worth of damage.5 
Can tort law strengthen society’s response to these risks?  In part, the 
answer to this question may depend on whether we see tort law as 
exclusively a matter of enforcing private rights, or whether we see it as 
also encompassing public law goals such as deterrence and risk 
spreading.  In any event, judges have begun to confront this question, 
                                                 
∗ Sho Sato Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the California Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy, University of California, Berkeley.  Work on this article 
was partially funded by National Science Foundation grant # 0624296.  I would like to 
thank Rosario Caledon and Josh Benson for research assistance, and Michael Hanemann, 
Elaine Shoben, and David Anderson for helpful comments on earlier drafts.  An earlier 
version of this essay was presented as the 2008 Monsanto Lecture on Tort Theory at 
Valparaiso University School of Law. 
1 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Deceased Reports:  Reports of Missing 
and Deceased (Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp? 
ID=192&Detail=5248 (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). 
2 Press Release, AIR Worldwide, AIR Worldwide Estimates Total Property Damage from 
Hurricane Katrina's Storm Surge and Flood at $44 Billion (Sept. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.iso.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2226 (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2009). 
3 Phil Hirschkorn, New York Reduces 9/11 Death Toll by 40, CNN NEW YORK BUREAU, Oct. 
29, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/10/29/wtc.deaths/ (last visited Feb. 
11, 2009). 
4 Personal Insurance Federation of California, THE TOPIC:  Catastrophes/Tsunami's [sic], 
in 2005 INSURANCE REFERENCE MANUAL, available at http://www.pifc.org/insurance_ 
manual/09_earthquake_tsunami.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). 
5 See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. 
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with varying results—some have rejected tort claims, based on these 
extraordinary risks, as non-justiciable, whereas others have recognized a 
basis for liability for failure to take precautions against risks such as 
terrorist acts or natural disasters. 
Part II of this Article provides case studies of how the tort system has 
responded to catastrophic risks such as large-scale flooding, terrorist 
acts, and climate change.  Liability approaches vary depending on the 
problem and jurisdiction, but there is no consistent pattern of immunity 
for sources of catastrophic risk.  Some courts have shied away from 
hearing cases involving massive liability exposure, while others have 
stepped up to the challenge. 
Part III examines how tort liability for catastrophic risks could 
contribute to societal goals of deterring undesirable risks and social risk-
spreading.  As we will see, the risk-spreading goal is particularly 
important because of the reluctance of private insurers to cover such 
risks.  There are other potential responses to this insurance gap, and in 
some situations one or another may be superior, but all of them have 
flaws that preclude any presumption of providing a superior form of 
risk-spreading compared with tort law. 
A few remarks about the scope of this Article are appropriate.  To 
begin, the types of risks discussed in this Article vary considerably, but 
they have some important commonalities nonetheless.  The situations 
involved typically have three major characteristics.  The first 
characteristic is magnitude.  These events involve either major loss of life 
(probably numbered in thousands rather than hundreds), or 
extraordinary physical damage and economic harm (on the order of one 
billion dollars or more).  The second is that the events were, at least 
arguably, caused by human activities, or the damages could have been 
substantially mitigated through precautionary measures.  Otherwise, the 
tort system would not be relevant.  The third major characteristic is that 
these situations evade at least part of the usual systems for managing 
risks.  For example, asbestos litigation overwhelmed the court system’s 
ability to process disputes, while terrorism and natural disasters have 
spotty insurance coverage (and what coverage does exist for terrorism 
and natural disasters tends to be government subsidized). 
There is no recognized term for these situations.  We could call them 
disasters, catastrophes, or mega-torts.  The corresponding risks could be 
identified as catastrophic risks or public risks, as opposed to the more 
garden-variety risks that the legal system manages on a daily basis 
without significant strain. 
There are significant variations within this category.  Some disasters, 
such as the destruction of the World Trade Center, involve dramatic 
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discrete events, with enormous damage occurring within a short period.  
Others, like climate change or asbestos deaths, take place over longer 
periods of time.  There are also borderline cases—events with damages 
in the hundreds of millions of dollars rather than billions, or leakage 
from hazardous waste sites (a multi-billion dollar source of clean-up 
expenses but not of direct damages). 
For present purposes, precisely characterizing these risks is 
unnecessary.  My goal is not to advocate the adoption of specific rules 
about these events or to debate the application of existing doctrinal rules.  
Rather, I want to explore the ways in which the legal system has 
responded to compensation demands for massive harms and to consider 
whether liability in some form would be socially desirable, where 
defendants were negligent or otherwise engaged in tortuous activities.6  
The tort system obviously cannot be the sole, or even the primary, legal 
response to catastrophic risks, but the tort system should be an 
important part of the mix. 
Given that this lecture is part of a series on tort theory, I should also 
say that I understand the term “torts” to not only center on the common 
law of torts but also to extend more broadly to other forms of 
compensation for harms caused by risky behavior.  Thus, I view 
legislatively created judicial remedies and even administrative 
compensation systems to be tort-like.  There are obviously important 
institutional questions about when courts should devise compensation 
rules and when they should await legislative action, and also about 
when judicial remedies are superior to administrative ones.  I will touch 
on these questions, but they are not my central focus.  Rather, my main 
interest rests in a more substantive question:  is it appropriate to require 
those who create extraordinary risks, or fail to take precautions against 
them, to finance compensation for those who are harmed? 
II.  CASE STUDIES 
This Part of the Article considers several major types of risks, 
including floods, terrorism, climate change, and environmental 
contamination.  All of these risks can be considered “billion dollar 
babies” in terms of their potential scope of liability.  These risks differ in 
other respects, such as the source of the risk (public entities versus 
private firms), the number of defendants, and the temporal profile of the 
                                                 
6  I say “liability in some form” because as discussed in the text, the question of whether 
liability should be delivered through the common law tort system or through a statutory 
judicial or administrative remedy is not my focus, although I will have something to say 
about the potential virtues of the common law as at least a default source of liability. 
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risk (one-shot event versus progressive harm).  It is useful, however, to 
begin with an overview of how tort liability fits into society’s overall 
portfolio of strategies for compensating for catastrophic risks. 
There is a tendency to assume that these risks are simply too 
extraordinary for the tort system to handle, presenting a threat of 
unconfined liability that the legal system cannot manage.  The response 
of the New York courts to a massive power blackout illustrates the 
tendency to avoid applying normal liability rules to catastrophic system 
failures.  Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.7 arose from the July 1977 blackout of 
New York City.  In order to avoid what it considered to be a potentially 
crippling level of liability, the court held that liability would be limited 
to direct customers of the company, despite the company’s blatant 
negligence that affected many other New Yorkers.8 
Notably, the court’s response was not to eliminate tort liability but to 
try to confine the class of victims in order to control damages.  Even so, it 
would be a mistake, as discussed below, to assume on the basis of Strauss 
that the tort system’s role is insignificant in handling catastrophic risks.  
                                                 
7  482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985). 
8 Id. at 37–38.  The plaintiff was injured by falling down a stairwell when the power 
went out in the common area of an apartment building.  Id. at 35.  The fact that the injury 
was in the common area was critical because in that part of the building, the landlord, 
rather than the tenant, was the customer of the power company.  Id.  Based on this fact, the 
court held that the tenant could not recover, and that any liability from harms caused 
would be limited to direct clients of the power company.  Id. at 37.  The court explained 
further: 
[W]e deal here with a system-wide power failure occasioned by what 
has already been determined to be the utility's gross negligence.  If 
liability could be found here, then in logic and fairness the same result 
must follow in many similar situations.  For example, a tenant's guests 
and invitees, as well as persons making deliveries or repairing 
equipment in the building, are equally persons who must use the 
common areas, and for whom they are maintained.  Customers of a 
store and occupants of an office building stand in much the same 
position with respect to Con Edison as tenants of an apartment 
building.  In all cases the numbers are to a certain extent limited and 
defined, and while identities may change, so do those of apartment 
dwellers.  While limiting recovery to customers in this instance can 
hardly be said to confer immunity from negligence on Con Edison, 
permitting recovery to those in plaintiff's circumstances would, in our 
view, violate the court's responsibility to define an orbit of duty that 
places controllable limits on liability. 
Id. at 38 (internal citations omitted).  The court also applied the same direct customer rule 
even when the tenants had an obligation under their lease to compensate the landlord for 
electricity:  the tenants still were not direct customers of the utility.  Milliken & Co. v. 
Consol. Edison Co., 644 N.E.2d 268 (N.Y. 1994).  Thus, the ironic result may be that 
plaintiffs who could recover if only a few people were injured are barred because the 
defendant harmed a great many people. 
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Strauss may express caution about sweeping liability for mega-risks, but 
this Article demonstrates that courts are not always unwilling to impose 
liability. 
A. An Overview of Compensation for Catastrophic Risks 
Steps can be taken to limit the human impact of natural disasters.  
Nevertheless, harm to human life and property cannot be completely 
avoided.  This raises the question of compensation.  The legal system 
provides a mix of public and private sector methods for compensating 
victims of natural disasters.  Each of the methods that have been used to 
provide compensation for catastrophic risks has its limitations. 
The first method of compensation is private insurance.  However, 
the unavailability of insurance for catastrophic risks due to expense or 
underwriting risks, exclusion of catastrophic risks by contract, and the 
difficulty of handling very large numbers of claims create significant 
hurdles.9  The second method of compensation, litigation against 
responsible private parties, also has its limitations:  the need for proof of 
negligence or other basis for liability; limits on the financial assets and 
insurance coverage of potential defendants; and other judicial doctrines 
limiting recovery.  Third, there is the possibility of obtaining 
compensation from the government through various routes:  tort claims 
against federal or state government for negligence (subject to immunity 
defenses); claims under special compensation schemes established for 
particular disasters; and claims based on constitutional provisions 
requiring compensation for the taking (or in some states, damaging) of 
property. 
In a sense, it is a mistake to speak of a “system” of compensation for 
catastrophic losses.  Instead, our society has a makeshift assembly of 
jerry-rigged components: 
In the final analysis, the U.S. has what might well be 
termed a patchwork system for providing financial 
compensation for catastrophic loss[] . . . Inevitably, in 
such a multifaceted milieu, where the tendency has been 
to develop discrete schemes in response to 
particularized categories of disasters (or rely on general 
welfare schemes that were enacted without disaster 
relief in mind), there will be ongoing fine-tuning of the 
system and a continuing dialogue over the efficacy of 
the measures in place.  While the description of the U.S. 
                                                 
9 See infra Part III (addressing insurance issues in more detail). 
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system may not point to a single best model for 
delivering financial compensation for catastrophic harm 
in all circumstances, its very complexity indicates the 
variety of pathways that might be taken.10 
Because of its common law roots, tort law may be well adapted to 
filling some of the gaps left in this patchwork.  We will now consider 
how courts have responded to tort claims regarding various forms of 
catastrophic events.  This survey covers floods, climate change, disease 
(cancer), and a form of war (terrorism)—not quite the Four Horsemen of 
the Apocalypse, but certainly bad enough. 
B. Flood Risks 
Flood risks are a useful place to start because of the diverse 
approaches to tort liability for defective flood control systems.  California 
provides broad liability for governmental entities that own or operate 
flood control systems, but the federal government has been granted 
broad immunity from liability. 
1. A Case Study:  California’s Liability System 
California law provides an example of the role that judicially 
imposed compensation can play.  The California Supreme Court 
developed liability rules for levee failures in three cases.  These cases are 
based in part on the California Constitution’s version of the Takings 
Clause, which refers to “taking or harming” of property.  It would be a 
mistake, however, to marginalize the California cases as involving an 
arcane state constitutional doctrine.  The California cases use tort 
concepts and move without much evident concern between common law 
tort and state constitutional analysis.  The court’s primary concern seems 
to be risk-spreading. 
The modern development of flood liability in California began with 
Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control District.11  In Belair, a flood control 
levee on the San Jacinto River gave way, flooding parts of the City of San 
Jacinto.  The California Supreme Court took this occasion to establish a 
new rule for determining the state’s responsibility for flood damages, 
based firmly on the need to spread the risks created by unreasonably 
flawed flood control systems: 
                                                 
10 Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR 
VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES:  A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 303, 356 (Michael Faure & Ton 
Hartlief eds., 2006). 
11 764 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1988). 
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Permitting recovery where the public entity's 
unreasonable conduct constitutes a substantial cause of 
damage to property owners negates the apprehension 
commonly associated with a rule of absolute liability—
the discouragement of beneficial flood control 
improvements—yet properly compensates for losses 
unfairly incurred. . . . Reasonableness, in this context, is 
not entirely a matter of negligence, but represents a 
balancing of public need against the gravity of private 
harm.12 
Consequently, the California court created a form of liability for 
defective levees, somewhat reminiscent of liability for manufacturing a 
defective product: 
The reasonableness of the public agency's conduct must 
be determined on the facts of each individual case, 
taking into consideration the public benefit and the 
private damages in each instance. . . . Inverse 
condemnation liability ultimately rests on the notion 
that the private individual should not be required to 
bear a disproportionate share of the costs of a public 
improvement . . . Thus, compensation for damages 
incurred as the result of a flood control agency's 
unreasonable conduct, measured in light of this 
balancing test, constitutes no more than a 
reimbursement to the damaged property owners of their 
contribution of more than their “proper share [to] the 
public undertaking.”13 
The second case, Locklin v. City of Lafayette,14 elaborated on Belair’s 
reasonableness rule.  The Locklin court rejected what it called the “arcane 
world of water law” theory that “if a private party had the right to inflict 
the damage, the government could assert the same immunity.”15  
Instead, the court adopted Belair’s reasonableness test in place of the 
earlier rule that had immunized the government on the basis of 
traditional property notions concerning the privilege to divert flood 
waters.  The court in Locklin also attempted to flesh out the Belair test.  
                                                 
12 Id. at 1079 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
13 Id. at 1079–80 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
14 867 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1994). 
15 Id. at 746. 
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The court identified two sets of factors.  The first set, called, the Albers 
factors, include: 
“First, the damage to th[e] property, if reasonably 
foreseeable, would have entitled the property owners to 
compensation.  Second, the likelihood of public works 
not being engaged in because of unseen and 
unforeseeable possible direct physical damage to real 
property is remote.  Third, the property owners did 
suffer direct physical damage to their properties as the 
proximate result of the work as deliberately planned and 
carried out.  Fourth, the cost of such damage can better 
be absorbed, and with infinitely less hardship, by the 
taxpayers as a whole than by the owners of the 
individual parcels damaged.  Fifth, . . . ‘the owner of the 
damaged property if uncompensated would contribute 
more than his proper share to the public undertaking.’”16 
To these factors, the court added a second set drawn from Professor 
Arvo Van Alstyne’s writings: 
(1) The overall public purpose being served by the 
improvement project; (2) the degree to which the 
plaintiff's loss is offset by reciprocal benefits; (3) the 
availability to the public entity of feasible alternatives 
with lower risks; (4) the severity of the plaintiff’s 
damage in relation to risk-bearing capabilities; (5) the 
extent to which damage of the kind the plaintiff 
sustained is generally considered as a normal risk of 
land ownership; and (6) the degree to which similar 
damage is distributed at large over other beneficiaries of 
the project or is peculiar only to the plaintiff.17 
The Locklin court had no occasion to apply these factors because the 
plaintiffs had failed to show what portion of their damages were due to 
the actions of the defendants.18  The California Supreme Court did, 
however, apply the factors in a third case, Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water 
                                                 
16 Id. at 749–50 (quoting Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 398 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1965)) 
(alteration in original). 
17 Id. at 750. 
18  Id. at 754. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/4
2009] Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change 1083 
District.19  The court in Bunch praised the trial judge’s finding of 
reasonableness as being based on  
a careful analysis of several factors, including the 
project’s purpose to divert the potentially dangerous 
natural flow in order to prevent flood runoff from 
fanning out over the Magnesia Cove alluvial plain, the 
public need for the project, the risk of private harm, the 
alternatives available to reduce the risk of harm, and the 
District’s overall fiscal and flood control 
responsibilities.20   
The court concluded that the trial judge had appropriately balanced 
these factors and found the district’s conduct reasonable.   
What had seemed like an arcane subject then became relevant to 
many policymakers after the state was required to pay almost half a 
billion dollars in damages for a levee breach, making the case infamous 
among government officials and civil engineers. Paterno v. State of 
California sent shock waves through the state’s flood control community 
and attracted attention from those in high office.21  The levee in question 
had been accepted by the state as part of its flood control system, but had 
been built earlier.  The trial judge found that the levee failed due to 
seepage and failure of the foundation, exacerbated by the highly porous 
materials making up its foundation.  In particular, 
One of plaintiff's experts, Meehan, characterized the 
levee as an inferior, high-risk levee which was poorly 
constructed and didn’t meet any engineering standards 
that existed any time during its life; it was built on a 
                                                 
19 935 P.2d 796 (Cal. 1997). 
20 Id. at 809–10.  The court summarized the relevant evidence as follows: 
Expert testimony indicated the detailed steps the District undertook to 
secure expert technical and engineering information on repairing its 
facilities and in managing those repairs represented sound engineering 
practice.  Expert testimony was in conflict as to the engineering 
feasibility of the short-term solution of repairing the breach . . . to 
restore the preexisting level of flood protection, allowing the District to 
devote its remaining resources to developing a comprehensive flood 
control plan.  But as the Court of Appeal observed, the trial court 
reasonably relied on the District’s expert testimony that any attempt to 
“quick fix” the problem by realigning the diversion levee and lining it 
with stronger material would have failed during Tropical Storm 
Dolores. 
Id. at 809. 
21 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. App. 4th 2003). 
Farber: Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11: Explori
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1084 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
very unstable foundation which was subject to severe 
seepage pressure and offered little resistance to seepage 
over the course of its history; the embankment was 
composed of loose, sandy material and its composition 
and construction were not adequate.  This is an 
indictment which the evidence supports.22 
The California Court of Appeals found an ample basis for liability.  
Again, risk-spreading was central to its analysis, along with a sense that 
harm due to a defective flood control system should be internalized as 
part of the cost of the flood control project: 
In large part our conclusion is based on the fact that the 
levee system benefited all of California and saved 
billions of dollars, and to require Paterno [the lead 
plaintiff] to bear the cost of the partial failure of that 
system—a failure caused by construction and operation 
of an unstable levee—would violate Locklin.  A basic part 
of the State’s flood plan was to accept existing levees as 
much as possible, to reduce the cost of an extensive, 
coordinated, flood control system.  The People benefited 
from that cost-saving feature.  However, the record 
shows the State never tested the Linda levee, or 
reviewed the records of its construction, to see if it was 
as strong as the global plans assumed it was, and the 
State even ignored specific warnings about the levee’s 
weaknesses.  In such circumstance, the costs of the levee 
failure must be deemed part of the deferred costs of the 
project.23 
In terms of the trial court’s reasoning, the appellate court found that 
the Sacramento River Flood Control Plan was a sufficient basis for 
liability, because the plan incorporated existing levees, such as the Linda 
levee, and “assumed the levee met engineering standards[]” despite its 
known substandard construction.24  In the court’s view, “[T]he State 
                                                 
22 Id. at 861. 
23 Id. at 857. 
24 Id. at 865.  The court described the defects graphically: 
The global plans assumed the levee met engineering standards, despite 
the fact that the records of its construction were public and showed 
that mining debris was simply scraped up and heaped, without 
compaction, to form the Morrison Grade, which later was raised and 
slightly reshaped, retaining the defective core.  The State claims “Linda 
levee as it existed after the work performed in 1934 was incorporated 
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must be charged with knowledge of how the levee was built.  It operated 
the levee for decades and had ample opportunity to examine it.  If it 
chose not to do so for fiscal reasons, that would indicate the loss should 
be absorbed by the State.”25 
The court then turned to a discussion of the Locklin factors.26  In light 
of these factors, the court found that the balance clearly weighed in favor 
of the plaintiff: 
The public received the benefit from the levee without 
having to bear the expense of ensuring it met the 
designed standards and was capable of carrying the 
water channeled to it by upstream features of the 
project.  That the levee did not break in 1955 or 1964 is 
either miraculous or simply indicates “third time pays 
for all,” meaning that the earlier high water events 
weakened the levee but not enough to cause a failure.  
The savings from not correcting the problems with the 
levee benefited the State, and it would be unfair to 
require Paterno to bear all of the risk of that plan. 
  . . . .  
  . . . Like a corroding pipe buried under Santa 
Monica or San Diego, the Linda levee was destined to 
fail.  Therefore, Paterno has borne the deferred costs of 
maintenance of the system, which costs should instead 
be spread to the public at large, which benefited from 
that system.27 
Finally, the court held that the state was liable for the construction 
defects because it had accepted responsibility for the levee system.  
                                                                                                             
into the finished 1940 work[,] in conformance with the levee design 
standards of the day,” but although the improvements may have been 
designed to the standards of the day, the trial court found the levee 
never met those standards. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
25 Id. at 871.  The court considered that an upgrade to the levee was an effort to improve 
its design capacity, and the court did not include efforts to correct defects that prevented 
the levee from meeting its design capacity; hence, liability was not barred by the rule 
against requiring the state to perform upgrades.  Id. at 873–74.  This is an important point.  
California courts recognize that it is not their proper role to decide on what kind of flood 
control system to construct, which involves profound tradeoffs between risk reduction and 
cost.  Instead, the courts merely insist that the system as a general matter should live up to 
the performance that the state has promised the public. 
26 Id. at 872–74. 
27 Id. at 875–76 (citations omitted). 
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“When a public entity accepts responsibility for an improvement, it 
becomes that entity’s improvement regardless of who built it.”28 
The court’s approach was largely paralleled by another decision 
issued at roughly the same time, Arreola v. County of Monterey.29  The 
Aerrola decision suggests that knowledge of a risk is a powerful liability 
factor:   
We conclude that in order to prove the type of 
governmental conduct that will support liability in 
inverse condemnation it is enough to show that the 
entity was aware of the risk posed by its public 
improvement and deliberately chose a course of action—
or inaction—in face of that known risk.30  
Although the State of California controls the levees, it does not 
directly control the development of the floodplains because land use 
planning is primarily a function of local government.  As a result of 
Paterno, local governments could approve unwise floodplain 
developments and thereby increase the state’s potential liability, while 
facing no liability threat themselves.  The California state legislature took 
a step toward resolving this problem with the passage of A.B. 70 in 
2007.31  The statute requires a local government to  
contribute its fair and reasonable share of the property 
damage caused by a flood to the extent that the city or 
                                                 
28 Id. at 876–77 (citations omitted). 
29 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).  Six different complaints were filed on behalf 
of approximately three hundred plaintiffs as a result of flooding by the Pajaro River.  Id. at 
44.  The plaintiffs alleged that local authorities failed to keep a channel clear, causing a 
levee failure.  Id.  They also alleged that the state had built culverts under Highway 1 that 
were too small to drain the flood, resulting in greater damage.  Id.  After some years of 
neglect, serious efforts were made to clear the channel in the early 1990s, but the work that 
was done was not enough.  Id. at 48.  Following a severe storm in March of 1995, there was 
a major flood.  Id. at 49. 
 Applying the Locklin factors, the court had little trouble finding the counties liable:   
Knowing that failure to properly maintain the Project channel posed a 
significant risk of flooding, Counties nevertheless permitted the 
channel to deteriorate over a long period of years by failing to take 
effective action to overcome the fiscal, regulatory, and environmental 
impediments to keeping the Project channel clear.  This is sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a deliberate and 
unreasonable plan of maintenance. 
Id. at 57.  The state failed to qualify for application of the reasonableness test because its 
conduct would not have been privileged at common law.  Id. at 62. 
30 Id. at 55. 
31 A.B. 70 adds section 8307 to the California Water Code. 
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county has increased the state’s exposure to liability for 
property damage by unreasonably approving new 
development in a previously undeveloped area that is 
protected by a state flood control project.32 
There is a safe harbor provision if the local government has complied 
with new statutory requirements for floodplain development.33  The 
touchstone for liability is failure to take reasonable precautions to avoid 
exposing the public to risk. 
2. The Federal Scheme 
If the levee failure in New Orleans had occurred instead in levees 
under the control of the State of California, the victims would have a 
good chance of recovering for the destruction of the city.  But recovering 
from the federal government for the destruction of New Orleans is much 
more difficult.34  In the case of Hurricane Katrina, it appears that the 
government was quite possibly at fault for failure to prevent the harm.  
According to some experts, the federal government was negligent in its 
                                                 
32 CAL. WATER CODE § 8307(a) (West Supp. 2009).  Under the code section, 
“‘Unreasonably approving’ means approving a new development project without 
appropriately considering significant risks of flooding made known to the approving 
agency as of the time of approval and without taking reasonable and feasible action to 
mitigate the potential property damage to the new development resulting from a flood.”  
Id. § 8307(c)(3). 
31 Id. § 8307(a).  Under section 8307(b), the local government’s duty of contribution is 
triggered only if the state has been sued for damages.  For an argument for expanded 
liability of local governments for unsafe development, see Timothy Kzolowski, Dams and 
Levees Are Not Enough: The Case for Recognizing a Cause of Action Against Non-Complying 
NFIP Communities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 245 (2007). 
34 In theory, recovery against the State of Louisiana would be another option, but it 
seems unlikely to say the least that the state has the financial resources to provide 
compensation on a large scale.  In addition, state law creates some obstacles to recovery.  
Compare Bernard v. Thigpen Constr. Co., 702 So. 2d 1387 (La. 1997), with Bernard v. 
Thigpen Constr. Co., 695 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1997), vacated by 702 So. 2d 1387 (La. 
1997).  The appellate court had approved certification of the class injured in the 1995 flood, 
but then the Louisiana Supreme Court set aside the certification after ruling in another 
decision that “the existence of individual causation and liability issues as to each potential 
class member may so predominate over common issues that class certification is 
inappropriate.” Bernard, 702 So.2d at 1387.  The appellate opinion is more interesting in 
imagining how plaintiffs could come together as a class following a natural disaster.  
Louisiana’s prescription period under La. R.S. 9:5624 may bar recovery because some 
causes of action may have already expired long before the flood took place.  See John J. 
Costonis, Avenal v. State: Takings and Damagings in Louisiana, 65 LA. L. REV. 1015 (2005) for 
further discussion on this point. 
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construction of the New Orleans flood control system,35 or at least, it is 
clear that the levees did not perform as designed.36 
The federal government is generally liable for negligence under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, but only if the negligence relates to the 
implementation of a project rather than the basic policy decisions 
involved in planning.  Moreover, the federal government enjoys 
especially broad statutory immunity for damages caused by flooding. 
The Flood Control Act of 192837 provides that “[n]o liability of any 
kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from 
or by floods or flood waters at any place[.]”38  The Act was passed as part 
of a congressional response to the great Mississippi flood of 1927.  
Congress decided for the first time that the federal government should 
play a major part in flood control, which had previously been seen as a 
state and local responsibility.  The goal of the Act appears to have been 
                                                 
35 For a discussion of these issues, see Daniel A. Farber, et. al, Reinventing Flood Control, 
81 TUL. L. REV. 1085 (2007), also available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/disasters 
/Farber_et_al.pdf.  For present purposes, I will ignore the possibility that climate change 
contributed to Hurricane Katrina, and hence to the harm, because of the severe and 
possibly intractable problems of proof. 
36 An important example of the potential for negligence claims is the failure of the 17th 
Street drainage canal floodwall in New Orleans.  Based on video recordings, reports by 
residents, and tests of the evolution of the failure, a National Science Foundation research 
team was able to reconstruct what happened early in the morning of August 29, 2005.  
Winds blew over the large oak trees growing near the top of the levees that should never 
have been allowed to grow there.  The trees’ root balls ripped out significant parts of the 
levee toe connected with underground seepage, a defect which also should have been 
corrected earlier.  A vertical joint opened up at the joint between two sections; the joint 
should not have been weaker than the segments it connected.  At this point, a deep breach 
opened.  As the water continued to rise, the walls leaned, opening more breaches.  In the 
end, the levee, floodwall, and supporting sheet pile were displaced laterally toward nearby 
homes by more than forty-five feet. 
 The fundamental flaw was that the levee was built on unstable soil.  Examination of 
early maps of the area revealed that bayou tributaries had crossed the canal at the point of 
failure.  These tributaries were filled with very soft soil that was buried by landfill before 
the levee was built.  The Army Corps of Engineers did not use sufficient boring samples to 
detect the variations in soil stability.  Further, the Corps built the levee to a very minimum 
standard of safety (1.3) on experience with rural rather than urban topography—that is, use 
of a design strength 1.3 times greater than the maximum expected loading.  This margin of 
safety was too small given the high human and economic costs of a levee failure in New 
Orleans.  And there were other flaws.  Field tests performed in 1965 should have warned 
the Corps that the levee itself was having a dangerous effect on underlying soil strengths.  
Even earlier, geologic tests performed by the Corps indicated the treacherous nature of the 
soil conditions.  And the tops of the floodwalls were almost two feet lower than projected 
because of subsidence.  Even when surveys in 2004 clearly showed that the floodwalls were 
not high enough, no corrective action was taken.  Thus, the design was not based on best 
available information. 
37 Flood Control Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-391, 45 Stat. 534–39 (1928). 
38 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2000). 
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to limit the federal government’s financial exposure to the direct cost of 
the flood control project.  In United States v. James,39 the United States 
Supreme Court rejected arguments that the provision was limited to 
immunity for property damage and instead emphasized the broad scope 
of the statutory language. 
This immunity will probably prevent victims of Katrina from 
recovering damages from the federal government.40  However, there 
may be some exceptions.  One important trial court ruling, In re Katrina 
Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, allows a suit to go forward.41  In the 
case, the plaintiffs claimed that the harm was caused by a navigation 
project (the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet canal, commonly known as 
“MR GO”) rather than a flood control project.  The plaintiffs’ lawyers 
clearly face an uphill battle.  Nevertheless, if the MR GO case is 
successful, the plaintiffs could recover billions of dollars. 
There is room for considerable debate about whether the failure of 
the flood control system was the fault of the federal government, and the 
degree to which similar damages would have occurred even if the 
system had met its design standards.  Victims who have suffered 
property damage do receive other kinds of assistance from the federal 
government, particularly from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (“FEMA”).  The families of those who died in the flood received 
nothing from the federal government unless they happened to have 
social security survivor’s benefits.  If the MR GO litigation proceeds, at 
least some survivors and property owners may receive recompense—
and the benefit of a full, objective investigation into the causes of their 
losses. 
                                                 
39 478 U.S. 597 (1986). 
40 As an illustration of the scope of immunity, consider Mocklin v. Orleans Levee District, 
877 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1989).  The plaintiffs brought suit against several defendants, 
including the Army Corps of Engineers, for the wrongful death of their son and sought 
damages under the Federal Torts Claim Act.  Id. at 428.  The child had drowned when he 
slipped from a sand bar caused by the dredging into one of the flotation channels used to 
prevent further flood damage; the Corps had dredged the lake (Lake Pontchartrain) to 
make flotation channels during the construction phase of levees.  Id.   The government’s 
defense relied on § 702c.  Id. at 428–29.  The Court concluded that the child died “from or 
by” “flood water” within the meaning of the FCA because the flotation channel where the 
plaintiffs’ son died contained water related to flood control; the flood channels were 
“inescapably” part of the flood control project.  Id. at 429–30. 
41 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 471 F. Supp. 2d 684 (E.D. La. 
2007). 
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B. Climate Change 
Whether excessive emitters of greenhouse gases will be required to 
compensate for the harm caused by climate change is unclear.  What is 
clear is that such claims will be raised in a variety of forums. 
The existence of damage has now become nearly incontestable.  We 
are already faced with a number of adverse impacts from climate 
change. 
Examples of observed changes caused by human 
releases of GHG [greenhouse gases] include shrinkage of 
glaciers, thawing of permafrost, later freezing and earlier 
break-up of ice on rivers and lakes, lengthening of mid-
to high-latitude growing seasons, poleward and 
altitudinal shifts of plants and animal ranges, declines of 
some plant and animal populations, and earlier 
flowering of trees, emerging of insects, and egg-laying in 
birds.42   
Sea level rise is one of the most predictable consequences of climate 
change.43  Apart from the unknown contribution of glacial melting from 
Greenland and Antarctica,44 the simple change in temperature of the 
oceans will contribute to thermal expansion, just as increased 
temperature causes the mercury in a thermometer to rise.45  As the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) explains, 
“Observations since 1961 show that the average temperature of the 
global ocean has increased to depths of at least 3000 m and that the ocean 
                                                 
42 Donald A. Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit Global 
Warming Commitments, 32 ENVT’L. L. REP. 10741, 10756 (2002) (footnote omitted).  
43 See, e.g., K. Hasselman, et al., The Challenge of Long-Term Climate Change, 302 SCIENCE 
1923, 1924 (2003) (Figure 2) (predicting a two meter increase in sea level under a “business-
as-usual” scenario by 2100, but only twenty centimeters under an optimum regulatory 
strategy).  The effects of sea level rise are discussed in more detail in Susanne C. Moser, 
Climate Change and Sea-Level Rise in Maine and Hawai’i:  The Changing Tides of an Issue 
Domain, in RONALD B. MICHELL, ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (2006).  
44 The IPCC states simply that “[d]ynamical processes related to ice flow not included in 
current models but suggested by recent observations could increase the vulnerability of the 
ice sheets to warming, increasing future sea level rise.  Understanding of these processes is 
limited and there is no consensus on their magnitude.”  Contribution of Working Group I 
to the Fourth Assessment Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 
2007:  The Physical Science Summary for Policymakers, 17 (2007).  However, the IPCC also 
reports that uncontrolled warming could result in sea level rises of up to seven meters 
(about twenty four feet) from the melting of the Greenland ice sheet alone.  Id. 
45 Changes in ocean temperature will also affect fish stocks.  See Hans O. Portner & 
Rainer Knust, Climate Change Affects Marine Fishes Through the Oxygen Limitation of Thermal 
Toleration, 315 SCI. MAG. 95 (2007). 
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has been absorbing more than 80% of the heat added to the climate 
system.  Such warming causes seawater to expand, contributing to sea 
level rise.”46  Moreover, IPCC reports that “[m]ountain glaciers and snow 
cover have declined on average in both hemispheres.  Widespread 
decreases in glaciers and ice caps have contributed to sea level rise (ice 
caps do not include contributions from the Greenland and Antarctic Ice 
Sheets).”47 
These and other harmful effects have provided fodder for litigation.  
Climate change litigation of various kinds is clearly on the rise, and the 
trend is to hold that potential damage from climate change is a legally 
cognizable injury.48  Although the favorable decisions have involved 
standing issues or judicial review of administrative actions rather than 
damage suits, scholars have begun earnestly to discuss the damage 
issues.49 
A case filed by the State of California against General Motors 
Corporation illustrates the potential for damage litigation.50  In an action 
                                                 
46 IPCC, supra note 45, at 5. 
47 Id. 
48 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497  (2007); In re Quantification of Envtrl. Costs, 
578 N.W. 2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding agency’s quantification of harm 
from CO2).  See Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum, Federal High Court, Benin, November 14, 2005, 
Unreported Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/ 
case-documents/nigeria/ni-shell-nov05-judgment.pdf (condemning natural gas flaring in 
Nigeria); Australian Conserv. Found. v. Minister for Planning, [2004] VCAT 2029, available 
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2004/2029.html (stating at the 
international level that greenhouse emissions must be taken into account in planning 
decisions).  Section 601 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that a 
nation “is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable 
under the circumstances, to ensure tbat [sic] activities within its jurisdiction or 
control . . . are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another 
state . . . .”  This principle is based on the famous Trail Smelter decision.  Trail Smelter (U.S. 
v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (1941) (making reference to United States federal common 
law.  For discussion of the international litigation, see Michael G. Faure & Andre 
Nollkaemper, International Liability as an Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate 
Change, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 123 (2007).  A critique of efforts to use the Alien Torts Act as a 
basis for climate change liability can be found in Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and 
International Human Rights Litigation:  A Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2007). 
49 See Angela Lipanovich, Smoke Before Oil:  Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil 
Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation is Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429 (2005); Hari 
M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational 
Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005); Vincent S. Oleszkeiwicz & Douglas B. 
Sanders, The Advent of Climate Change Litigation Against Corporate Defendants, 27 INT’L 
ENVTL. REP. 936 (2004). 
50 Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment, California v. General Motors 
Corp., 2006 WL 2726547, C06-05755 (N.D. Cal.) (filed Sep. 20, 2006).  As discussed below, 
the suit has been dismissed and is now pending on appeal.  It should be noted that climate 
change may breed other kinds of damage litigation.  For example, if carbon sequestration 
technology becomes widespread and carbon dioxide releases take place, there could well 
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filed in federal district court against leading automobile manufacturers, 
the state alleges two causes of action for public nuisance, one under 
federal common law and one under California law.  The complaint 
focuses on several key examples of damages.  First, the state allegedly 
will be required to spend large sums of money on studies and 
infrastructure changes to its water systems.  The Sierra Nevada snow 
pack, which is the source of much of California’s water, has allegedly 
been shrinking.  This decrease in snow pack is likely to increase flooding 
and interfere with the state’s water system.  Preventing flooding and 
assuring a reliable water supply will require major financial investments 
by the state.  Second, rising sea levels will cause increased beach erosion 
and increased salt infiltration into the Sacramento Bay-Delta, which will 
then require increased expenditures to protect the eco-system and the 
water supply for much of the state.  Third, climate change is impacting 
extreme heat events, increasing the risk of injury or death (especially to 
the elderly).  Finally, the complaint alleges that  
[d]ozens of other impacts have begun or are anticipated 
with a high level of certainty, including increased risk 
and intensity of wildfires, risk of prolonged heat waves, 
loss of moisture due to earlier snow pack melt and 
related impacts on forests and other ecosystems, and a 
change in ocean ecology as water warms.”51   
The complaint adds that “[a]ll of these impacts are the subject of State 
study and planning, which costs the State millions of dollars.”52  
Consequently, California requests that the defendants be held jointly and 
severally liable for monetary damages.53   
For the moment, however, much of the litigation seems to be 
stymied.  At present, California v. General Motors Corp. and a similar 
                                                                                                             
be litigation by injured parties.  For a discussion of the issues, see Alexandra B. Klass & 
Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Caron Sequestration:  Assessing a Liability Regime for 
Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide (March 2008) (on file with the author), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=alexandra_klass. 
51 Complaint, supra note 50, at ¶ 56. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at “RELIEF REQUESTED[,]” ¶¶ 1–2.  The complaint also requests declaratory relief 
as well as attorney’s fees.  The complaint in similar litigation filed against public utilities 
can be found at 2004 U.S. Ct. Pleadings LEWIX 1910 (July 21, 2004).  In terms of injuries, the 
complaint alleges rising temperatures (¶ 104), declining snowfall in New England (¶ 105), 
growing pubic health threats from increased temperatures (¶¶ 110–11), damage to coastal 
resources (¶¶ 112–17), and damage to water supplies (¶¶ 118–20).  In the Midwest, the 
complaint alleges damage to the Great Lakes (¶¶ 121–27), damage to agriculture (¶¶ 128–
31), and more generally, harm to the states’ ecology, natural resources, and exposure to the 
risk of abrupt climate change (¶¶ 132–46). 
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lawsuit against electrical utilities are pending on appeal after the district 
courts ruled that the political question doctrine precluded the litigation.54  
This application of the political question doctrine seems dubious. 
Under current doctrine, the political question argument seems 
untenable.  Baker v. Carr55 limits the political question doctrine to cases in 
which there is a textually demonstrable commitment of an issue to 
another branch of government, judicially manageable standards do not 
exist, or the nation needs to speak with a single voice.56  None of these 
                                                 
54 See Conn. v. Am. Elec. Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  See also Cal. v. General 
Motors Corp., Cause No. 2006 WL 2726547 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).  Reliance on the 
political question doctrine seems misplaced here, given the narrow scope of that doctrine 
as defined by the Supreme Court.  On the other hand, a similar public nuisance suit was 
allowed to go forward in North Carolina v. TVA, 439 F. Supp. 2d 486 (W.D.N.C. 2006).  
Although the TVA court did not directly consider the political question doctrine, TVA did 
invoke separation of powers concerns, and parts of the court’s discussion speak to the 
political question issue: 
The appropriate level of pollution emissions is a matter, not for only 
one or two Branches, but rather for all three Branches of government. 
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (Sub-chapter 1, Part A of the Clean Air 
Act, wherein Congress sets forth “air quality and emissions 
limitations”); 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1–50.12 (wherein the Environmental 
Protection Agency sets forth “national primary and secondary ambient 
air quality standards”); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of 
Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 343 (6th Cir.1989) (discussing the 
role of the courts in controlling air pollution).  As the Supreme Court 
described it, air pollution “is, of course, one of the most notorious 
types of public nuisance in modern experience.”  Washington v. General 
Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114, 92 S.Ct. 1396, 31 L.Ed.2d 727 (1972).  
The interdependence of the Branches necessary to control and reduce 
this national threat is certainly not repugnant to the Constitution, and 
refusing to allow TVA to make unlimited emissions decisions under 
the protection of a discretionary function exemption would not place 
the Judicial Branch in the position of performing tasks more properly 
accomplished by other Branches. 
TVA, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 495. 
55 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
56 Baker actually subdivides some of these factors, resulting in a disjunctive list of six: 
1. “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department;” 
2. “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving [the issue];” 
3. “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;” 
4. “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government;” 
5. “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made;” 
6. “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.” 
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factors seem to be present in either case.  Courts customarily hear 
nuisance cases, so obviously there is no textual constitutional 
commitment of such issues to another branch of government, nor is there 
a lack of sufficient judicial standards in a nuisance case to satisfy Article 
III of the Constitution.  As to whether the nation needs to speak with a 
single voice, the Supreme Court rejected that argument in considering a 
statutory climate change issue and finding foreign policy concerns 
beside the point.57  What makes the climate change nuisance cases 
different from garden-variety nuisance cases is merely that the potential 
liability and societal implications are very large. 
It was probably scale of the climate change issue that made these 
two district judges frantically reach out to the political question doctrine 
as a way of dodging the litigation.  The district courts’ concern seemed to 
be about the magnitude of the issue of climate change and the potential 
repercussions of a ruling for society as a whole.58  But the Supreme Court 
has never found the magnitude of the remedy or the societal impact of a 
case to be reasons for holding it non-justiciable, and the Court clearly 
considers at least some aspects of climate change to be justiciable.59  Of 
course, in the end, five Justices can rule however they wish on how to 
define the political question doctrine, but in the meantime, existing 
doctrine provides little basis for dismissing the suits. 
Assuming the suits are held to be justiciable, the plaintiffs will still 
face major hurdles.60  Among the challenges are potential statutory 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 217.  In the text, I have packaged 2 and 4 together as variants of the manageable 
standards factors, and 3, 5, and 6 as involving the need for the nation to speak with one 
voice. 
57  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (considering a statutory climate 
change issue, and finding foreign policy concerns beside the point). 
58 For example, in the California case, the district court cited the global implications of the 
issue: 
Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with sufficient explanation or 
legal support as to how this Court could impose damages against the 
Defendant automakers without unreasonably encroaching into the 
global warming issues currently under consideration by the political 
branches.  Because a comprehensive global warming solution must be 
achieved by a broad array of domestic and international measures that 
are yet undefined, it would be premature and inappropriate for this 
Court to wade into this type of policy-making determination before the 
elected branches have done so. 
General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 at *10. 
59 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue the 
federal government on a statutory issue relating to climate change, and the Court ruled in 
the plaintiffs’ favor on the merits.  549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
60 For analysis of the liability issues, see Bradford C. Monk, Civil Remedies, in Michael B. 
Gerrard, Global Climate and U.S. Law 183, 200–13 (2007); Kenneth B. Alex, California’s 
Global Warming Lawsuit: The Case for Damages, in CREATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE 
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preemption arguments, defining the standard of care and the recipient of 
the duty,61 and proof of causation and damages.  These questions are 
difficult, but not necessarily insurmountable if science fills some of the 
gaps in the plaintiffs’ cases. 
The proof issues in climate tort litigation may be susceptible to 
scientific evidence, if not now, then soon.  It is difficult to link specific 
harmful events to climate change, which is why we will probably never 
know whether Hurricane Katrina was an effect of climate change.  But at 
least in some instances, the fingerprint of climate change may be more 
discernible. 
An important, if not shocking, example of the effects of climate 
change is provided by a recent European heat wave.  A heat wave in 
2003 caused over ten billion dollars in economic losses and up to 35,000 
deaths in Europe.62  The scientific evidence now seems to establish by at 
least a preponderance of the evidence that these deaths were due to 
climate change.  Scientists estimate that climate change increased the 
odds of such an event by a factor of four to ten over the “base rate.”63  
The IPCC has also concluded that “the excess deaths of the 2003 
heatwave in Europe are likely to be linked to climate change.”64  Thus, it 
seems quite possible to tie at least some specific adverse effects to climate 
change with considerable confidence.65  Clearly, additional problems 
remain,66 in particular, deciding how to allocate responsibility among a 
large number of greenhouse gas emitters.  But that problem is not 
necessarily unsolvable.67 
                                                                                                             
ENVIRONMENT (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denis Antolini eds., 2007) (Alex heads the state of 
California’s climate litigation team).  
61 On this issue, see David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air:  The Duty of 
Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (2007). 
62 See Myles Allen et al., Scientific Challenges in the Attribution of Harm to Human Influence 
on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1388–89, 1398 (2007). 
63 Id. at 1392. 
64 Ulisses Confalonieri, Human Health, Climate Change 2007:  Impacts, Adaptability 
and Vulnerability.  Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 307 (2007).  For further discussion of heat 
waves and climate change, see Ann E. Carlson, Heat Waves, Global Warming & Mitigation, in 
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, CATASTROPHIC RISKS: PREVENTION, COMPENSATION, AND 
RECOVERY (2007):  Article7, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art7. 
65 If a negligence standard is applied, it would also be necessary to show that if 
greenhouse emissions had been kept to reasonable levels, the heat wave would not have 
occurred.  Current scientific analysis does not seem to have addressed this point, but it 
seems feasible to do so.  
66 Problems include determination of the standard of liability and various preemption 
arguments that may prevent the courts from reaching the merits. 
67 For some thoughts about cost allocation, see Daniel A. Farber, Apportioning Climate 
Change Costs, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y (2007). 
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The district judges who found the issue to be a political question 
were worried about the manageability of the litigation and its potential 
for expansive social impacts.  It is not hard to imagine that these 
concerns might resurface again in different doctrinal guise if courts are 
ultimately faced with the merits issues, perhaps in the form of rulings 
that carbon dioxide emitters do not owe a duty of care toward the 
victims of climate change.  Climate change is a very long-term problem, 
and it seems unlikely that the liability issues will be definitively settled 
for some time, regardless of the outcome of the present litigation. 
C. Large Scale Environmental Contamination and Toxics Exposures 
Courts have also been confronted with difficult problems of 
causation and long time lags in cases involving widespread 
contamination issues.68  These cases demonstrate some lessons for 
catastrophic torts more generally. 
1. The Proximate Cause Problem and Medical Monitoring 
In many situations involving toxics exposures, the biggest barrier to 
tort recovery is proof of causation.  Even when a general link between a 
disease and exposure to a substance has been established, it may be 
difficult to show that a particular individual’s disease was caused by 
exposure to that specific substance: 
Specific causation requires a plaintiff to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
caused that particular plaintiff’s harm.  Many courts 
interpret the preponderance standard to require a 
relative risk ratio of 2.0 or greater—for example, a 
defendant’s conduct more than doubled the plaintiff’s 
risk of injury. . . . Thus, if an epidemiological study 
indicates that exposure to a particular substance 
increases the incidence of a disease among those 
exposed by only forty percent, then a court will probably 
find that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of 
                                                 
68 Despite these difficulties, plaintiffs have had some degree of success, as exemplified in 
a 2004 settlement in which Dupont paid $340 million to settle a class action, including $235 
million in medical monitoring expenses.  See Thomas O. McGarity, The Complementary Roles 
of Common Law Courts and Federal Agencies in Producing and Using Policy-Relevant Scientific 
Information, 36 ENVTL. L. 1026, 1045 (2007). 
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proving specific causation unless more direct evidence is 
offered.69  
There is considerable scholarly support for a different approach to 
probabilistic harm.  Rather than providing full compensation for victims 
whose probability of causation is over fifty percent and none for those 
who fall under this threshold, this approach would provide proportional 
recovery to all victims.70  Thus, if there is a sixty percent chance that a 
victim’s injury was caused by exposure to the toxic chemical, the victim 
would receive compensation for sixty percent of her damages.  Similarly, 
if the victim had only a twenty percent likelihood of causation, twenty 
percent of the damages would be compensable.  However, courts have 
not seemed to follow the lead of those commentators who have 
suggested proportional recovery.71 
It may sometimes be possible to prove specific causation, 
particularly when a toxic substance greatly increases the background risk 
of a disease.  An additional problem though is that even when a plaintiff 
is known to be at risk, diseases such as cancer may have long latency 
periods.  Courts have provided some limited relief to these at-risk 
plaintiffs in the form of compensation for the expense of medical 
monitoring. 
The prevailing approach to medical monitoring is illustrated by In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation.72  The Third Circuit held that a medical 
monitoring claimant must prove four elements:  (1) that she was 
significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through the 
                                                 
69 Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort:  Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1449–50 (2005) (footnotes omitted).  For further discussion on this issue, 
see Restatement Third of Torts:  Liability for Physical Harm § 28 cmt. B, rep. Note 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 April 6, 2005). 
70 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A “Public 
Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); William Landes & Richard 
Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 417 
(1984); Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell:  Relation of Cause of Cause-in-Fact Rules for 
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982). 
71 One way of recovering for what amounts to a risk of future harm takes the form of 
stigma damages to property, where the possibility that exposures will be dangerous 
allegedly becomes translated into the value of the property.  See Dealers Mfg. Co. v. County 
of Anoka, 615 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 2000) (allowing stigma damages for property that is 
merely close to contaminated property); Chance v. BP Chemicals, 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 
1996) (requiring some type of physical damage or interference with use as a predicate for 
stigma damages). 
72 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), aff’d 35 F.3d 717, 784–88 (3d Cir. 1994).  A useful analysis of 
this remedy can be found in Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the 
Problem of Limits, 88 VA. L. REV. 1975 (2002).  Abraham points out that the duty to pay for 
medical monitoring can be seen as akin to the duty to rescue a person whom the defendant 
has tortuously placed in danger.  Id. at 2002. 
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defendant’s negligence; (2) that as a proximate result she suffers an 
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (3) that the 
increased risk makes medical examinations reasonably necessary; and (4) 
early detection and treatment of the disease is possible.  In most medical 
monitoring cases, plaintiffs have sought or courts have awarded 
traditional common-law lump-sum damages.  In a few toxic exposure 
cases, however, litigants have pursued, or courts have expressed their 
preference for, periodic payment of future medical surveillance expenses 
out of a court-supervised trust fund or similar mechanism.73 
The Supreme Court dealt with medical surveillance liability a decade 
ago in Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley,74 a case arising under 
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”).75  The plaintiff had been 
exposed to asbestos as a pipe fitter while working for the railroad.  After 
he learned that he faced an increase risk of cancer, he sought to recover 
damages for the resulting emotional distress and a lump-sum recovery 
for future medical check-ups.  The Court noted a number of general 
concerns about allowing recovery for medical monitoring not connected 
with any existing injury, including the potentially wide scope of liability, 
the lower priority of claimants with monitoring costs versus those with 
already realized injury, the difficulty of identifying what extra 
monitoring is warranted by an exposure, and the possibility that 
monitoring expenses would be covered by health insurance or some 
other source.  The Court’s observations suggest some unease with 
medical monitoring damages in general.  Ultimately, however, the 
Court’s holding was narrow and rejected only what it considered to be a 
very broad rule of recovery of lump-sum damages: 
 We have not tried to balance these, or other, 
competing considerations here.  We point them out to 
help explain why we consider the limitations and 
cautions to be important—and integral—parts of the 
state-court decisions that permit asymptomatic plaintiffs 
a separate tort claim for medical monitoring costs.  That 
being so, we do not find sufficient support in the 
common law for the unqualified rule of lump-sum 
damages recovery that is, at least arguably, before us 
here.  And given the mix of competing general policy 
                                                 
73 See Amy B. Blumenberg, Medical Monitoring Funds:  The Periodic Payment of Future 
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (1992).  The 
leading case on medical surveillance is Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).  
74 521 U.S. 424 (1997). 
75 Employers’ Liability Acts (Federal Employers' Liability Act) (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51–60 
(2007).  
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considerations, plaintiff’s policy-based arguments do not 
convince us that the FELA contains a tort liability rule of 
that unqualified kind. 
 
 This limited conclusion disposes of the matter before 
us.  We need not, and do not, express any view here 
about the extent to which the FELA might, or might not, 
accommodate medical cost recovery rules more finely 
tailored than the rule we have considered.76 
Unfortunately, a few state courts seem to have misinterpreted this 
limited holding as a broad rejection of medical monitoring expenses.77  In 
any event, this and other cases indicate that the Supreme Court is 
unlikely to be on the cutting edge of expanding tort liability. 
Medical monitoring is a form of preventive action, and some courts 
have used public nuisance law to provide compensation for the expenses 
of other kinds of preventive measures.  One example is lead paint, a 
widespread form of environmental contamination that poses special 
risks to young children.  The use of lead paint in housing was prohibited 
in 1978, but 24 million housing units still contain the paint and its 
resulting lead dust.78  In the past decade, state and local governments 
have had some successes in public nuisance suits against the lead paint 
                                                 
76 Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 521 U.S. at 444.  The Court’s lack of sympathy to tort 
plaintiffs is fairly palpable here—not the willingness to dispose of the case on a ground that 
the court says is only “arguably present” in the case before it.  In addition, as the dissent 
pointed out, the majority’s discussion is extremely muddled: 
It is not apparent why (or even whether) the Court reverses the Second 
Circuit's determination on Buckley's second claim. The Court of 
Appeals held that a medical monitoring claim is solidly grounded, and 
this Court does not hold otherwise. Hypothesizing that Buckley 
demands lump-sum damages and nothing else, the Court ruminates 
on the appropriate remedy without answering the anterior question: 
Does the plaintiff have a claim for relief? Buckley has shown that 
Metro-North negligently exposed him to “extremely high levels of 
asbestos,” 79 F.3d, at 1341, and that this exposure warrants “medical 
monitoring in order to detect and treat [asbestos-related] diseases as 
they may arise.” Id., at 1346. Buckley's expert medical witness 
estimated the annual costs of proper monitoring at $950. Ibid.  We do 
not know from the Court's opinion what more a plaintiff must show to 
qualify for relief. 
Id. at 448 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation 
omitted) (footnote omitted). 
77 See Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1712 (2007). 
78 See Katie J. Zoglin, Getting the Lead Out:  The Potential of Public Nuisance in Lead-Based 
Paint Litigation, in CREATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, 340–42.   
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manufacturers.79  In Rhode Island v. Lead Industries Ass’n, after the trial 
court upheld a public nuisance claim, one defendant settled for almost 
twelve million dollars, and the others were eventually found liable for 
abatement costs (possibly in the one billion dollar range) after a jury 
trial.80  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also allowed a suit to go forward 
despite the plaintiff’s inability to identify the source of the paint for 
particular houses.81   
Most recently, the California Court of Appeals upheld public 
nuisance claims against the lead-based paint industry.82  The court held 
that a private class action for damages was foreclosed as being 
essentially a products liability case in disguise, but that the government’s 
action for abatement of the nuisance could proceed.  Relying on the 
California lead paint case, County of Santa Clara, as well as other 
authorities, a New York federal district court upheld public nuisance 
claims against manufacturers of  methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MBTE), a 
gasoline fuel additive.83  Summarizing California law, the district court 
said: 
While it is true that “the law of nuisance is not intended 
to serve as a surrogate for ordinary products liability,” 
California courts have allowed nuisance claims to 
proceed where the manufacturer’s or distributor’s 
actions have “created or assisted in the creation of the 
nuisance.”  Such actions, however, must amount to more 
than simply the manufacture or distribution of the 
defective product—rather, a defendant must take other 
“affirmative acts” that contribute “directly” to the 
nuisance.  Importantly, a failure to warn regarding the 
dangers of a product, without more “activity directly 
connected” to the creation of the nuisance, is an 
insufficient basis for nuisance liability.  But where a 
defendant engages in more substantial conduct 
                                                 
79 In New York, there has been successful litigation premised on the theory that the 
manufacturers engaged in deceptive marketing regarding the safety of the paint.  See City 
of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 660 N.Y.S. 2d 422 (App. Div. 1997). 
80 Zoglin, supra note 78, at 350–54. 
81 City of Milwaukee v. NL Indust., Inc., 691 N.W. 2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).  Quoting 
and endorsing the city’s argument, the court’s definition of public nuisance included three 
elements plus public policy:  “(1) harm occurred to the public; (2) defendants were a 
substantial factor in causing the harm; and (3) abatement of the cause of the harm was 
reasonable.”  Id. at 892. 
82 County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (2004). 
83 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ester (MTBE) Products, 457 F. Supp. 2d 455 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
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contributing to the nuisance, liability may well be 
appropriate.84 
The district court then concluded that active promotion of the 
product satisfied the requirement for public nuisance liability.  Note that 
the remedy in these cases is clean-up—not an award of damages for 
harm caused to children who are exposed to the paint. 
As the examples of medical monitoring and lead paint clean-up 
indicate, remedial innovation is one way to deal with the issues posed by 
major risks.  An analogy in the climate change area would be to provide 
compensation for adaptation expenses or, more narrowly, for monitoring 
and forecasting the local impacts of climate change.85 
2. Oil Spills 
Another facet of catastrophic risk litigation is presented by litigation 
for oil spills.  Oil spill litigation is less likely to turn on causation-in-
fact—the damage is often immediate and unmistakable—than on 
proximate cause (or alternatively, the existence of a duty toward the 
plaintiffs).  For instance, in Benefiel v. Exxon Corp.,86 the plaintiffs were 
consumers who alleged that the Exxon Valdez oil spill had resulted in 
higher oil prices.  The flaw in their claim was the existence of intervening 
causes: 
In this case, the spill itself did not directly cause any 
injury to the appellants.  Rather, plaintiffs alleged the 
spill triggered a series of intervening events, including 
the decision of the United States Coast Guard to close 
the Port of Valdez to facilitate clean-up efforts; the 
alleged decision by refineries in the western United 
States to raise prices rather than to use their own oil 
reserves to make up any shortage; and the decision of 
wholesalers, distributors and retailers to pass on these 
price increases.87 
The Benefiel court concluded that the “plaintiffs themselves alleged 
the existence of at least one intervening act causing the price hike:  the 
                                                 
84 Id. at 463–64 (footnotes omitted). 
85 For an argument that these costs are an appropriate basis for compensation, see 
Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605 
(2007). 
86 959 F.2d 805 (9th Cir.1992). 
87 Id. at 807. 
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alleged decision of California oil refiners to exploit the supposed 
shortage.”88  
Benefiel was only one piece of the massive litigation arising out of the 
Exxon Valdez spill, however.89  More than a hundred law firms were 
involved in over two hundred suits, involving more than thirty thousand 
claims.  The total damage claims exceeded fifty billion dollars.  Although 
some of these claims were settled or dismissed, more than ten thousand 
remained.  Some of these claims were foreclosed by the rule of Robins 
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,90 which requires that a person must suffer 
direct physical harm in order to recover economic losses.  On the other 
hand, there is a recognized exception to Robins for commercial 
fishermen.  This exception covered fisheries actually closed to fishing by 
the spill, including claims that the market value of their later salmon 
catch was decreased on the Japanese market because of concerns about 
contamination.91  Beyond the direct economic effects of the spill, Alaska 
natives also sought compensation for the disturbance caused to their 
way of life.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that these damages 
were not compensable because the plaintiffs failed to show “special 
injury.”92 
                                                 
88 Id. at 808; see also Adkins v. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liab. Fund, 101 F.3d 86 (9th 
Cir.1996) (applying the Benefiel test to lost profit claims by electrical utility, cafe, tourist 
businesses, and boat repair companies). 
89 For an overview of the litigation, see Deborah S. Bardwick, Note, The American Tort 
System's Response to Environmental Disaster: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study, 19 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 259 (2000).  The author, Bardwick, concludes that despite its magnitude, 
the recovery for the plaintiffs was inadequate: 
 Based on the vast extent of litigation and multi-billion-dollar 
judgments awarded against Exxon, a casual observer might acquire an 
impression that the legal system fully compensated the losses suffered 
by those impacted by the spill.  However, the legal system in fact 
denied redress to many plaintiffs who lost most of their livelihoods as 
a result of damage to natural resources.  Many plaintiffs also did not 
receive compensation for non-market-based, intangible values that the 
resources had given them. 
Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).  She calls for “statutes that are specifically written to address 
the legitimate claims of individuals who suffer significant economic loss as an indirect 
consequence of the disaster, and create a right for native groups to recover for the actual 
full extent of their harm from loss of a subsistence lifestyle.”  Id. at 289.   
90 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
91 For a more in depth discussion of the Robins rule, see Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for 
Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez Spill, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1994). 
92 In re Exxon Valdez:  Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 
1997).  The court reasoned:  
 Admittedly, the oil spill affected the communal life of Alaska 
Natives, but whatever injury they suffered (other than the harvest 
loss), though potentially different in degree than that suffered by other 
Alaskans, was not different in kind.  We agree with the district court 
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Section 1006(d)(1) of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act93 provides that the 
measure of natural resource damages is: 
(A) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or 
acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged natural 
resources; 
(B) the diminution in value of those natural resources 
pending restoration; plus 
(C) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.94 
These costs are to be assessed with respect to restoration plans, 
which are to be promulgated by federal or state trustees.  Double 
recoveries are precluded by subsection (d)(3).  Section 1006(e) requires 
the President to issue damage assessment regulations.  Pursuant to those 
regulations, a rebuttable presumption of correctness will apply to 
damage determinations. 
One of the components of damages under section 1006 is the cost of 
restoration.  Arguably, only restoration can fully compensate the public 
for loss of a natural area.95  Unfortunately, one of the lessons of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill is that our capabilities in the area of restoration are 
still quite primitive, and may sometimes be counterproductive.96 
Paralleling the CERCLA regulations for natural resource damages, 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) 
developed equivalent rules under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.97  
                                                                                                             
that the right to lead subsistence lifestyles is not limited to Alaska 
Natives.  While the oil spill may have affected Alaska Natives more 
severely than other members of the public, “the right to obtain and 
share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated nature, and cultivate 
traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psychological benefits in pristine 
natural surroundings” is shared by all Alaskans.  The Class [of 
Alaskan Natives] therefore has failed to prove any “special injury” to 
support a public nuisance action. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
93 Oil Pollution Act (OPA), Pub. L. No. 101-380, Title I, § 1006, 104 Stat. 494 (Aug. 18, 
1990). 
94 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (2007). 
95 See Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration As The Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage to 
Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1991). 
96 See Marguerite Holloway & John Horgan, Trends in Environmental Technologies:  Soiled 
Shores, SCI. AM., Oct. 1991, at 100. 
97 40 C.F.R. pt. 112 Appendix F (2008).  These rules were upheld in Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. 
Dept. of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  The court found the Ohio ruling decisive 
regarding the general legitimacy of contingent valuation.  Id.  Any claims that a particular 
contingent valuation was performed without adequate safeguards could be addressed in a 
later enforcement proceeding.  Id. at 773–74. 
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One lesson here is that damages to natural resources are not 
impossible to fix even when the resources have values that are not 
captured by markets.  Oil spills are a frequent cause of such damage, but 
floods can also injure public resources like parks or wetlands, and such 
damage is likely to result from climate change.  The problem of 
identifying the responsible parties may be daunting in the climate case, 
but at least the means of measuring the harm to nature are well 
established. 
3. Asbestos 
And then there is the problem of asbestos.  In principle, asbestos is 
just another form of environmental contamination, but the special 
significance of asbestos litigation warrants separate treatment.  The scale 
of asbestos litigation has been extraordinary, and it is surprising that the 
asbestos issue has not received more sustained attention from legal 
academics.  As of 2002, according to a RAND report, approximately 
730,000 people had filed claims, and at least 8,400 entities had been 
named as defendants, though most defendants were in eight key 
industries.98  One prominent epidemiological model estimated over 
200,000 asbestos-related cancer deaths from 1985 to 2009.99  This is a 
horrendous death rate:  think of three 9/11 incidents per year for over 
twenty years.  Of course, the deaths lacked the drama of even a single 
9/11, perhaps accounting for the lack of public attention to the issue.  If 
the asbestos cases had been combined into one lawsuit, the scale of the 
catastrophe would have indeed been more apparent, but the large 
number of cases and their special and temporal diffuseness prevented 
full attention to the scale of the asbestos disaster. 
The resulting litigation has had a huge economic impact.  Total 
spending on the litigation through 2002 was about seventy billion 
dollars.  About one third of the spending was in the form of defense 
costs, another quarter went to plaintiffs’ costs and fees, and the 
remaining forty percent went to compensate plaintiffs.100  As of mid-
2004, at least seventy-three defendants had filed for bankruptcy.101  In a 
recent development, W.R. Grace sought the approval of a bankruptcy 
court to settle all asbestos claims against it for three billion dollars, with 
                                                 
98 STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION xxiv–xxv (2005). 
99 Id. at xix–xx.  The RAND researchers found some empirical confirmation for the 
model.  Id. at 18–19. 
100 Id. at xxvi. 
101 Id. at xxvii. 
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deferred payments being guaranteed by fifty percent of the company’s 
common stock.102 
The legal system has seemingly been unable to find an appropriate 
procedural mechanism for handling this flood of litigation.  Efforts to 
consolidate the litigation have been frustrating.  In Amchem Products, Inc. 
v. Windsor,103 the Court rejected an ambitious effort to use the class action 
mechanism to settle the claims.  The Court held that certification of the 
settlement class was improper because the interests of some class 
members were inadequately represented.  The question of how to handle 
claims that have not yet matured has also plagued state courts.  In a 
number of courts, unimpaired plaintiffs are allowed to file claims that 
are then relegated to the deferred docket; cases can come off the deferred 
docket only if the claimant meets specified medical criteria such as a 
diagnosis of malignancy.104 
There have been a number of other attempts at procedural 
innovation.  Some judges have engaged in large-scale, non-class action 
consolidations, with fourteen of these consolidated cases involving 
hundreds (and sometimes thousands) of claimants.105  For instance, a 
Baltimore state judge heard more than eight thousand claims against 
more than a hundred defendants.106  The largest known consolidated 
trial, involving 9,600 plaintiffs, was held in a specially constructed 
courtroom at the Jackson County Mississippi state fair grounds.107  
Consolidation of this number of claims can involve great confusion; for 
example, one appellate court noted that it was uncertain just how many 
claims had been decided at trial.108 
In another effort at consolidation, federal courts have attempted to 
use the bankruptcy reorganization process as a way of settling massive 
numbers of claims, in a substitute for the class action procedures rejected 
in Amchem.  Efforts to use prepackaged reorganization plans 
(“prepacks”) have run into some of the same difficulties that plagued the 
class action mechanism.109  The situation cried out for congressional 
attention, but no legislative solution was forthcoming. 
                                                 
102 W.R. Grace to Pay Estimated $3 Billion to Settle Present, Future Asbestos Claims, 39 ENV. 
REP. (BNA) 707 (April 22, 2008). 
103 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
104 CARROLL, supra note 98, at xxi. 
105 Id. at xxii–xxiii. 
106 Id. at 33. 
107 Id.; see id. at 38–41 (listing large-scale trial consolidations). 
108 Id. at 43. 
109 See In re Combustion Engineers, 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting pre-pack plan as 
inequitable and lacking statutory authorization). 
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The asbestos litigation is a cautionary tale about the difficulties 
confronted by the legal system in handling a massive number of claims.  
Some leadership from the Supreme Court, either through more 
aggressive interpretation of current law or through its rulemaking 
powers, might have led to a more effective procedural mechanism for 
handling the asbestos cases.  With legislative assistance, however, some 
of these barriers may be surmountable.  An American Bar Association 
report recommends the following procedural reforms for post-disaster 
litigation: 
To improve judicial effectiveness in such cases courts 
should be granted authority:  (a) to concentrate decision-
making power in a single or small group of judges 
consistent with the right to jury trial; (b) to locate the 
proceedings in a single court or limited number of 
courts; (c) to designate a single set of legal principles to 
govern consistent with due process and applicable law; 
(d) to requisition adequate resources and personnel; (e) 
to utilize reasonable latitude in fact-finding consistent 
with the right to jury trial; (f) to take such steps as will 
streamline and speed the adjudicatory process; and (g) 
to recognize the propriety of pro rata and other forms of 
partial awards where necessary.  Authorization to 
undertake such steps should be the subject of enabling 
legislation.110 
Any detailed discussion of procedural reform for mass harms is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  This is a subject of active interest by 
procedural experts, with significant recommendations for change from 
the American Law Institute.111  For our purposes, it suffices to say that 
the asbestos litigation should be regarded as setting a floor—a level of 
                                                 
110 American Bar Association, Rule of Law in Times of Major Disaster (Sept. 2007), 
Principle 6 (commentary), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ruleoflaw/rol_ 
disaster.pdf.  The text of Principle 6 provides:  “To the fullest extent permitted by law the 
persons affected by a major disaster should be compensated for their losses through 
insurance coverage and the operation of the judicial system.”  Id.  Principle 7 provides: 
 Government payment of compensation or additional assistance to 
persons affected by a major disaster should be considered when 
government is either implicated in the major disaster or public 
authorities determine that it is in the public interest to do so.  
Principles of equal treatment, due process and transparency should 
govern the distribution of compensation and disaster assistance. 
Id. 
111 ALI, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (Discussion Draft No. 2). 
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process that we already know how to deliver—rather than as a ceiling on 
what the litigation system can accomplish. 
D. Terrorism 
Completing our survey of the worst hazards of modern life, we turn 
to terrorism.  Prevention has been the primary focus of attention, but 
compensation issues have not been ignored.  In the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, Congress established a special 
victim’s compensation fund.112  Compensation was limited to individuals 
who were present at the crash site and who suffered physical injury or 
death.113  The statute covers medical expenses, loss of earnings, “loss of 
business or employment opportunities[] to the extent recovery for such 
loss is allowed under applicable State law,” and non-economic loss such 
as physical and emotional pain.114  Victims also had the alternative of 
going through the tort system, but tort recoveries were limited to the 
insurance coverage of the defendants, spurred by fears that allowing 
otherwise might cause litigation to cripple the airline industry.115 
A special master was appointed to administer the fund.  The special 
master issued a regulation to govern claims that in some instances 
seemed to go significantly beyond the statutory language.116  Although 
the statute called for an offset for life insurance and pension benefits, the 
special master reduced the offset to the extent of the individuals’ policy 
payments or pension contributions.  The special master also set a floor of 
approximately $300,000 on economic recoveries.  He established a 
guideline for economic loss, based on age, family size, and recent 
earnings, with a cap for the highest-level incomes.  The special master 
also created a schedule for non-economic losses, with $250,000 to each 
victim, and $100,000 each to close relatives.  Apparently, the special 
master’s strategy was to “closely enough approximate the range of tort 
compensation to make no-fault benefits under the Fund an offer that 
could not be refused by most eligible parties.”117  As it turned out, 
                                                 
112 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 
230 (2001) (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000 & Supp. 2005)).  For an overview of the 
scheme, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 10.  For criticism of the 9/11 compensation scheme, 
see Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master:  Undermining the 
Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006).  
The opt-out cases are now being considered in federal district court, along with claims for 
respiratory damages. 
113 49 U.S.C. § 40101.   
114 Id. § 402 (5), (7). 
115 Id. §§  408, 201(b). 
116 See 67 Fed. Reg. 11233 (Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2008)). 
117 Rabin and Bratis, supra note 10, at 341. 
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ninety-seven percent of the surviving families applied to the fund, with 
only seventy families opting out.118 
It would be a mistake to think that the harms of terrorism can be 
redressed only through such a legislative compensation mechanism.  
Common law liability has also been a real factor.  Two recent cases 
indicate the potential for liability. 
Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp.119 involved the hijacking of a Kuwait 
airlines flight.  Four terrorists boarded a Middle Eastern Airlines 
(“MEA”) flight in Beirut.  The flight ended in Dubai, where the four 
terrorists connected with a Kuwait Airways flight bound for Karachi, 
Pakistan.  Three American diplomats were also on board the second 
flight.  Shortly after take-off from Dubai, the terrorists hijacked the plane, 
which landed in Tehran.  The plane sat on the airport tarmac for days 
while the terrorists tortured the three American diplomats, finally 
murdering two of them.120  The surviving diplomat and the estates of his 
two deceased colleagues brought suit against MEA.  They claimed that 
MEA’s negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries and deaths 
occurring aboard the Kuwait Airways flight.  The court held that a jury 
could have reasonably found that when Kuwait Airways boarded 
                                                 
118 The Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000), is another example of a 
compensation scheme designed to limit tort litigation in order to protect a critical industry.  
The Act caps the total liability of the nuclear industry for damages resulting from a single 
nuclear accident, in return modifying normal tort rules to make it easier to establish 
liability.  The purpose of the statute was to enable the nuclear industry to obtain insurance 
coverage.  The Act also provides for assessments of the industry as a whole to cover 
additional victim compensation.  The Supreme Court upheld the Act against a takings 
claim in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).  For further 
discussion of the statute, see Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation 
Legislation?—The Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
 A more recent scheme was enacted to protect pharmaceutical companies from claims 
relating to possible bioterror attacks.  At the end of 2005, the President signed the Public 
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREPA”).  42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d–e (2006).  The 
statute provides immunity (for anything less than willful misconduct) for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers for producing vaccines and other countermeasures for a biological 
emergency such as a bio-terror attack or pandemic flu outbreak.  The Secretary of HHS 
seems to have broad discretion in declaring such an emergency.  Once an emergency is 
declared, a “Covered Countermeasure Process Fund” is established.  No appropriations 
will be provided until after the emergency is declared and the fund is established.  Thus, 
there is no guarantee that funding will be forthcoming, which could leave victims in the 
position of having their tort remedies preempted but without any alternative means of 
compensation.  See Brian Kurt Copper II, Higher and Dry? The Public Readiness and 
Emergency Preparedness Act and Liability Protection for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (April 11, 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896299.  For a 
discussion of these statutory compensation schemes, see Robert Rabin, The Renaissance of 
Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 698 (1995). 
119 89 F.3d 117 (2nd Cir. 1996). 
120 Id. at 119. 
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connecting passengers in Beirut, it knew or should have known that 
some might be terrorists.121 
The first major issue in Stanford was the existence of a duty owed by 
Kuwait Airlines to the plaintiffs.  The court held that MEA had a duty to 
protect passengers on connecting flights from unreasonable risks.  The 
court found it irrelevant that the victims were not passengers on an MEA 
flight because of the nature of the risk.122 
A related issue was the foreseeability of the specific injury that 
occurred.  In this case, there was evidence that MEA knew of the 
threatened attacks by Hezbollah terrorists and that terrorists were 
boarding flights in dirty airports to infiltrate other airlines.123  Moreover, 
even a child would have been suspicious of the unusual behavior of the 
four hijackers who boarded in Beirut.  A reasonable person could surely 
foresee a risk of hijacking from passengers who purchased last-minute 
tickets with cash, checked no luggage for a flight from the Middle East to 
the Far East, and took a bizarrely circuitous route.124  A jury could 
reasonably find that the zone of risk stretched at least as far as the 
innocent passengers aboard flights with which the four hijackers would 
eventually connect.125 
The second case, In re September 11 Litigation,126 involved opt-outs 
from the compensation fund.  The defendants included the airlines, 
airport security companies, and airport operators.  All were accused of 
negligently failing their security responsibilities.127  In addition, the 
plaintiffs accused the owners and operators of the World Trade Center of 
negligently designing, constructing, maintaining, and operating the 
buildings, as well as botching the evacuation.128  Airline passengers also 
sued the plane manufacturers for manufacturing inadequate cockpit 
                                                 
121 Id. at 124. 
122 Id. at 124–25.  Indeed, the evidence suggested that the risk was fairly obvious. The 
plaintiffs demonstrated that MEA was aware of the weak security at the Beirut airport.  For 
instance, the Lebanese military had, but did not use, metal detectors, and X-ray equipment 
was unavailable.  Id. at 120.  In the court’s view, a jury could reasonably find that MEA 
knew or should have known of the danger that terrorists would try to board their airline 
only to transfer later to a vulnerable, interline target airplane. This was particularly true 
because of heightened political tensions and an ongoing terrorist campaign that posed 
continuing threats against Americans and Kuwaitis.  Id. at 124.  
123 89 F.3d at 125. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
127 Id. at 288. 
128 Id. at 288, 298. 
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doors, which allowed the hijackers to invade the cockpits and take over 
the aircraft. 129 
The court held that the airlines and security companies owed a duty 
of care to victims on the ground to screen passengers and their 
belongings, and that the plane crash was within the class of foreseeable 
hazards outcomes.  Similarly, the WTC’s owners and managers had a 
duty to implement adequate fire safety measures, even in the case of a 
fire caused by hijackers.130 Likewise, the court found that the terrorists’ 
unauthorized entry into the cockpit was not unforeseeable and did not 
constitute an “intervening” or “superseding” cause that could, as a 
matter of law, break the chain of causation proceeding from defective 
design of the cockpit doors. 131 
Duty was once again a key issue.  The court balanced several factors:  
the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the 
proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like 
liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public 
policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of 
liability.132  The court emphasized that in today’s world, people depend 
on others charged with special duties to protect them. 133  For instance, 
passenger screening is performed for the benefit of passengers and those 
on the ground.134  More generally, New York courts have found that 
aircraft owners and operators owe a duty to those on the ground who 
may be harmed or sustain property damage resulting from improper or 
negligent operation of an aircraft.135 
The court then turned to an inquiry regarding “disproportionate risk 
and reparation allocation.”136  Airlines, airports, and security firms could 
best control the boarding of airplanes and guard against hijackings and 
                                                 
129 Id. at 287–88.  Because Virginia does not recognize strict liability for product defects, 
the counts against the airplane manufacturers were dismissed as to the victims of the 
Pentagon crash.  Id. at 306. 
130 Id. at 300. 
131 280 F. Supp. 2d at 308–10. 
132 Id. at 290–92. 
133 Admittedly, the court said, New York courts have been cautious about imposing 
liability for failure to control the conduct of others because of practical concerns about 
potentially limitless liability and about unfairness.  But courts have imposed a duty based 
on the defendant’s control over the third party tortfeasor’s actions, or a relationship with 
the plaintiff requiring the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the conduct of others.  Id. 
at 290–91. 
134 Id. at 294–95.  The court relied in part on the Stanford case for the proposition that 
airlines have a duty not only to passengers on the flights they operate but also to 
passengers on connecting flights, and thus may be liable when they allow terrorists to 
board planes.  Id. at 295. 
135 Id. at 294–96. 
136 Id. at 293 (quotation marks omitted). 
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the dangers they present to crew, passengers, and those on the ground.  
The court explained, 
The scope of duty to a particular class of plaintiffs 
depends on the relationship to such plaintiffs, whether 
plaintiffs were within a zone of foreseeable harm, and 
whether the harm was within the class of reasonably 
foreseeable hazards that the duty exists to prevent. . . .  
 
In order to be considered foreseeable, the precise 
manner in which the harm was inflicted need not be 
perfectly predicted.137 
Plaintiffs also have the ability to pursue claims against terrorist 
organizations and their supporters.  For instance, in Gilmore v. Palestinian 
Interim Self-Government Authority,138 the plaintiffs were the family of the 
victim of a terrorist shooting in Jerusalem.  They brought suit against the 
Palestinian authority as well as some individual defendants who were 
allegedly responsible for planning and carrying out the shooting.  The 
court dismissed the individual defendants for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, but allowed the charges against the Palestinian Authority to 
go forward. 
Liability was based on a federal statute that authorizes claims 
against perpetrators of international terrorism, provided three elements 
are met.  First, the defendant’s activities must involve violent acts that 
would violate U.S. criminal law if performed in America.  Second, the 
acts must “appear to be intended” to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population, to influence government policy, or to change a government’s 
conduct through mass destruction.139  There is an exception for “acts of 
war,” but despite the common term “war on terror,” this exception has 
                                                 
137 Id. at 295.  Turning to the owners and operators of the World Trade Center, the court 
also concluded that a duty of care existed.  The plaintiffs and society could expect them to 
follow applicable safety and fire codes and to create appropriate evacuation routes and 
procedures.  They were best able to guard against the risks of fire, and their liability 
exposure was limited by statute to their insurance coverage.  Id. at 293–94.  The court also 
held that plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded alleged proximate cause given the defendants' 
knowledge of the possibility of terrorist acts, large-scale fires, and even airplane crashes at 
the World Trade Center.  Id. at 296.  On the other hand, the court pointed to the possibility 
that the acts of the terrorists might be considered an intervening cause, depending on the 
evidence at trial.  Id. at 292 n.7 & 293. 
138 422 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2006). 
139 Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Pub. Law. No. 101-519, 104 Stat. 2250 (Nov. 5, 1990), 
amended by Pub. Law. No. 107-56, Title VIII, § 802(a), 115 Stat. 376 (Oct. 26, 2001) (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006)). 
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been held inapplicable to al Qaeda because it is not a national military 
force.140  The statute provides for treble damages, and courts have 
upheld damage awards in the $100–200 million range (which may or 
may not ever be collectable, of course).141 
Statutory liability also extends to those who aid and abet terrorist 
actions.  In Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Holy Land Foundation for 
Relief and Development,142 the parents of an American killed in Israel by 
Hamas sued Islamic charities that allegedly helped fund Hamas.  The 
Seventh Circuit held that merely funding Hamas was not enough to 
establish liability.  Even small donations made knowingly and 
intentionally in support of terrorism are enough for liability.  As the 
court explained, 
[T]here would not be a trigger to pull or a bomb to blow 
up without the resources to acquire such tools of 
terrorism and to bankroll the persons who actually 
commit the violence.  Moreover, the organizations, 
businesses and nations that support and encourage 
terrorist acts are likely to have reachable assets that they 
wish to protect.  The only way to imperil the flow of 
money and discourage the financing of terrorist acts is to 
impose liability on those who knowingly and 
intentionally supply the funds to the persons who 
commit the violent acts.143 
Given the prevalence of terrorism in today’s world, we have not seen 
the last of claims against those who have failed to provide adequate 
protection, as well as those who may have provided material assistance 
to terrorists.  The preliminary indications are that courts are open to 
finding liability where the potential for terrorist acts is sufficiently 
foreseeable. 
III.  THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF TORT LAW 
As we have seen, damages for defective flood control are readily 
available under California law against the state government, but far 
                                                 
140 Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333–34 (D. Utah 2006).  See also Estate of 
Klieman v. Palestinian Authority, 424 F. Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D.D.C. 2006) (exception does 
not apply if defendant’s actions violated the laws of war). 
141 See Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274, 282 (1st Cir. 2005) ($116 million); 
Knox v. Palestine Liberation Org., 442 F. Supp. 2d 62, 77–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ($192 million in 
damages); Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1337–38 (D. Utah 2006) ($102 million). 
142 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002). 
143 Id. at 1021.    
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more difficult if not impossible under federal law when the defendant is 
the Army Corps of Engineers.  Environmental claims have amounted to 
billions of dollars, whether from oil spills, asbestos, lead, or other 
dangerous substances.  Claims based on terrorist acts are beginning to 
find a receptive judicial audience.  In short, the judicial system has 
responded in a variety of ways to claims for catastrophic losses. 
In considering the desirability of compensation for catastrophic risks, 
we need to think broadly about the societal interests at stake.  The tort 
system—and by extension, other compensation schemes—has several 
goals.144  Probably the two most important are deterring harmful conduct 
(the efficiency or deterrence rationale) and corrective justice (restoring 
moral balance by rectifying harm).  Loss distribution (which can be 
considered a way of providing insurance against social risks) is another 
goal, perhaps more important in social compensation schemes than in 
tort.  Finally, there are goals oriented to maintaining social cohesion —
providing redress for social grievances or exhibiting social solidarity 
with victims.145 
The present discussion will be limited to fault-based liability. The 
concerns about imposing liability for large-scale public risks are 
formidable enough in any event.  If courts are willing to surmount those 
barriers, it seems likely that they will usually require some kind of 
showing of fault rather than imposing strict liability.  In addition, 
liability for catastrophic risks poses a significant likelihood of insolvency, 
a situation in which economic analysts say strict liability can lead to 
under-deterrence.146  Thus, for present purposes, we can assume that the 
conduct is of a kind that society would like to deter—or at least, activity, 
the volume of which society would like to decrease—and that at least 
some actor’s conduct was responsible for the harm in question.  
Moreover, catastrophic losses are precisely the kinds of risk for which 
loss-spreading, through some kind of insurance scheme, seems most 
warranted.  Yet, private insurance coverage for victims is problematic. 
Thus, the arguments for negligence liability or some similar fault-
based theory may seem clear.  But, as we shall see, some significant 
difficulties remain to be confronted. 
                                                 
144 For discussion of these goals, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS 
OF TORT LAW 14–20 (2d ed. 2002).  For a more general discussion of how these goals have 
shaped the role of government, see DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS:  GOVERNMENT 
AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 253–91 (2002). 
145 For an insightful discussion of this solidarity rationale in the context of catastrophic 
natural events, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Roles of Government in Compensating Disaster 
Victims, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, available at www.bepress.com/ils. 
146 See Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and 
Economics Perspective, 29 LAW AND POL’Y 339, 342–43 (2007). 
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A. Deterrence 
A core function of tort law is to deter undesirable conduct.147  
Defendants in catastrophic risk cases are generally organizations, given 
the unlikelihood that an individual defendant will have the assets to 
provide more than a trivial amount of compensation.148  Presumably, 
business enterprises are likely to take a more rational approach to 
potential liability than ordinary individuals.  The ordinary assumption of 
tort law is that businesses respond to such liability incentives. 
Governmental organizations are not profit-maximizing institutions, 
but still large tort awards require fiscal dislocations that are not likely to 
be politically popular.  Thus, government organizations also have an 
incentive to avoid conduct that can lead to liability, although this motive 
probably must compete with other political incentives. 
The deterrent function of tort law is reinforced by the organizational 
dynamics regarding catastrophic risks.  An individual’s mistake may be 
the immediate cause of a catastrophic failure, but there is often a deeper 
organizational flaw that makes that mistake possible and prevents it 
from being corrected.149  Avoiding catastrophic risks can be a challenging 
task for organizations.  Many organizations engage in activities that can 
cause massive harm if things go wrong—just consider electrical utilities 
that operate nuclear power plants, government agencies that build flood 
control systems, and operators of blood banks.  To prevent devastating 
accidents or to take adequate precautions against other causes of 
disaster, organizations must be alert for minor unexpected events that 
may be harbingers of larger risks; they must react decisively when 
mistakes occur to reform the systems which made the mistakes possible.  
They also need to track comparable issues at other organizations to learn 
from their mistakes and their precautions.   
None of this comes very naturally to organizations, which often find 
it easier to perfect existing routines, optimizing their behavior under 
“normal” conditions but creating little capacity to detect or respond to 
the abnormal.  This stagnation is especially dangerous for organizations 
                                                 
147 Abraham, supra note 72, at 16.  For some misgivings about the efficacy of tort liability 
as a deterrent, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:  Does Tort 
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994). 
148 Of course, it is conceivable that an individual defendant might have extraordinary 
personal wealth, although so far this has not yet been the case in any of the reported cases 
involving catastrophic loss. 
149 Consider, for example, the organizational flaws that lead up to 9/11.  See The 9/11 
Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report:  Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States 339–60 (2004). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/4
2009] Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change 1115 
that deal with major emergencies such as floods, fires, and other natural 
and manmade disasters.  
Organizations that await major failures before adapting tend to enter 
crisis mode and find learning and response even more difficult.150  For 
example, following the demise of the space shuttle Challenger, NASA 
faced political pressures, inertia, and resource constraints that expedited 
some organizational changes but made other structural and cultural 
adjustments more difficult.151  Furthermore, in the absence of a 
significant environmental change or destabilizing event, social science 
research indicates that lessons learned in organizations often tend to be 
forgotten or misapplied.152 
Even worse, because of the infrequency of major disasters, trial and 
error learning may lead organizational members to forget lessons from 
past disasters.  Social scientists contend that in the case of disaster 
preparedness, trial and error processes lead to “superstitious 
learning[]”—organizational leaders concluding that resources 
designated for disaster preparedness are idle and should be applied 
elsewhere.153  Disaster preparation calls for a different form of learning in 
which organizations draw on not only their own experiences, but also 
those of other organizations.  Such network learning exists for a variety 
of learning processes.154 
Tort liability may promote this process of institutional learning in 
two ways.  First, it multiplies the number of times the lesson of any 
particular catastrophic event is repeated.  Individuals learn about the 
causes of a catastrophic failure when it happens, again when the lawsuit 
is filed, and yet again when the judgment is entered.  The later stages, 
like booster shots for a vaccine, reinforce the initial knowledge of an 
organizational disaster.  Second, tort liability enlists new organization 
members in disaster prevention.  There is some evidence that involving 
                                                 
150 K.H. Roberts, P. Madsen, & V. Desai, The Space Between in Space Transportation:  A 
Relational Analysis of the Failure of STS 107, in ORGANIZATION AT THE LIMIT:  LESSONS FROM 
THE COLUMBIA DISASTER 81–98 (M. Farjoun & W. Starbuck eds., 2005). 
151 HOWARD E. MCCURDY, INSIDE NASA:  HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGE IN THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM (1993).  
152 Pabli Martin De Holan & Nelson Phillips, Remembrance of Things Past? The Dynamics of 
Organizational Forgetting, 50 MGMT. SCI. 1603 (2004); James G. March, et al., Learning from 
Samples of One or Fewer, 2.1 ORG. SCI. 1 (1991). 
153 Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REV. SOC. 319, 335 
(1988).  
154 See, e.g., Christine M. Beckman & Pamela R. Haunschild, Network Learning:  The Effects 
of Partners’ Heterogenity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 92 (2002); 
Joel A.C. Baum & Paul Ingram, Survival-Enhancing Learning in the Manhattan Hotel Industry, 
1898–1980, 44 MGMT. SCI., 996 (1998); Linda Argote et al., The Persistence and Transfer of 
Learning in Industrial Settings, 36 MGMT SCI. 140 (1990). 
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multiple organizational units can facilitate organizational learning.155  
Because of the potential scale of liability, shareholders and others with 
financial interests—including management officers with stock options—
have an interest in ensuring that the company does not implode due to 
disaster liability.  No politician wants to be responsible for bankrupting 
the government.  Moreover, the legal department in the organization 
also acquires an interest in ensuring that steps are taken to avoid 
liability.  Thus, a broader set of organizational viewpoints are brought to 
bear on disaster prevention activities. 
Recent events in California illustrate how liability can focus 
organizational attention.  The threat of liability helped spur the 
Governor’s proposal for a “massive” levee improvement program in the 
Central Valley, which faces dire flood risks.156  A Central Valley 
newspaper summed up the situation: 
For the last four years, California leaders have lived with 
the reality that state taxpayers could become liable for 
billions of dollars in damages the next time a state-
owned levee fails in the Central Valley.  
 
Such levees protect more than 200,000 homes and $47 
billion in property, according to state figures.  
Potentially, a single flood could bankrupt the state. 
 
In recent years, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and state 
lawmakers have poured millions of dollars into levee 
repairs and have helped pass two bond issues that will 
deliver another $4.9 billion.  Those expenditures will 
help reduce the flood risk, but by themselves, they won't 
fully shield the state from legal exposures caused by 
recent court decisions.157 
                                                 
155 See Christina Fang, Jeho Lee, & Melissa A. Schilling, Exploration and Exploitation: The 
Influence of Organizational Structure on Organizational Learning (March 2007), available at   
http://mackcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/TMiniPapers07/Fang%20Lee%20Schilling_Explor
at&Exploit.pdf. 
156 Editorial, Give Local Governments a Share of California's Levee Liability, OAKLAND (CAL.) 
TRIB., April 6, 2006.  Confirming awareness of the Paterno decision by political leaders, a 
state legislator is quoting as saying, "I think it is going to have long-lasting and rather 
severe financial effects on the state of California."  Id.  Hurricane Katrina undoubtedly also 
had an effect in bringing flood issues to the attention of California lawmakers. 
157 Editorial, Flood Flip-Flops:  Where does Governor Stand?  State is on the Hook for Massive 
Damages; Local Governments Need to Share in Risk, SAN DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, 
March 11, 2007.  The editorial notes that the Schwarzenegger administration initially called 
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This episode confirms the more general arguments that prospective 
liability for catastrophic risks can have a salutary effect on organizational 
priorities. 
That individuals respond to incentives is an article of faith among 
economists, who also tend to view businesses, if not governments, as 
rational actors.  In any event, it is hard to believe that potential liability 
increases the amount of risky behavior by large organizations.  
Presumably, organizations do not get to be large without being able to 
respond, at least crudely, to the incentives presented by their 
environments.  Thus, at least as a working assumption, we can proceed 
on the basis that tort liability has at least some beneficial incentive effect 
even on large organizations. 
B. Corrective Justice 
Scholars vigorously debate whether corrective justice—the idea of 
“just deserts”—has an independent role in tort law, as well as how to 
define that role.158  In any event, many people do share the intuition that 
wrongdoers have a moral duty to compensate their victims.  Application 
of this intuition to catastrophic risks can involve difficulties, not because 
of the absence of wrongdoing, but because the defendants are typically 
entire organizations rather than the individuals directly involved in 
causing the harm. 
Admittedly, the case for compensation as a form of “just deserts” is 
strongest when compensation is provided by the particular individuals 
who are responsible for harm, or when responsible individuals have 
benefited from conduct that imposes risk on others.  With large-scale 
risks, this may be difficult because of the way responsibility is diffused 
through organizations.  Furthermore, the specific individuals who were 
at fault for a catastrophic loss often lack the resources to cover more than 
a small (and perhaps even trivial) portion of the damages.  The question, 
then, is whether it is appropriate to impose liability on the organization 
and indirectly on stakeholders or taxpayers, even though they were not 
immediately involved in the harmful conduct and may not even have 
                                                                                                             
for new tort statutes and a state constitutional amendment to modify Paterno, but later 
retreated from that stance.  Id. 
158 For some classic early contributions to the debate, see Richard A. Posner, The Concept 
of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981); George P. 
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Law, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).   For an effort at 
synthesis, see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997).  A good summary of ideas about corrective 
justice can be found in Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing 
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 443–51 (1990). 
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been aware of the risk.  There is a vigorous debate on this issue, 
particularly in the context of corporate criminal liability. 
In some cases, tort liability can be justified on the basis of unjust 
enrichment.  If shareholders have benefited because the company has cut 
corners on safety, they clearly should make recompense.  The same is 
true for those who enjoyed lower taxes because their government failed 
to take necessary precautions.  But such unjust enrichment may be 
difficult to show, particularly when there is a significant lag between the 
wrongful activity and the materialization of the risk.  For instance, the 
original shareholders who benefited from the lower costs of shoddy 
construction may already have sold out at a handsome profit to new 
shareholders who had no knowledge of the risk.159 
Some moral theories go beyond this kind of individualistic approach 
and hold groups liable regardless of the individual situations of their 
members.160  We might think, for example, that citizens accept moral 
responsibility for the actions of their governments in return for the right 
to participate in democratic politics and receive the benefits of 
government actions, or that government as entities should be considered 
to have moral rights and responsibilities, or that they suffer from a moral 
taint from being associated with their government’s wrongful acts.  
Exploring these questions in depth, however, would take us too far 
afield.  Even if such theories do not make an affirmative case for liability, 
they may at least be strong enough to convince us that shareholders and 
taxpayers do not face an injustice when they incur financial sacrifices 
due to liability. 
Under many circumstances, “just deserts” may provide a less 
powerful reason than deterrence for imposing liability for catastrophic 
risks.  Nevertheless, it may sometimes be an important supporting 
factor, particularly when stakeholders have received benefit from 
wrongful acts that they had the capacity to control.161 
C. Risk Spreading 
Risk spreading can provide a powerful justification for liability for 
catastrophic risks.  Understanding this point requires an understanding 
                                                 
159 I discuss this and other aspects of corrective justice in the context of climate change in 
a forthcoming article, Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation:  Justice for Climate 
Victims in a Complex World, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 377.  
160 For discussion of those theories, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for 
Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 703–11 (2003). 
161 For a discussion of this issue in the context of climate change, see Daniel A. Farber, 
supra note 159. 
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of the complicated relationship between catastrophic risks, insurance, 
and government intervention. 
Flood damages provide a good starting point.  Although the federal 
government generally has no legal liability, even if floods are caused by 
its negligence, it has often found itself in the position of bailing out flood 
victims with various forms of disaster relief.  The flood insurance 
program is intended both to regularize this practice and to provide 
incentives to municipalities and individuals to limit their risk exposure.  
The basics of flood insurance have been succinctly summarized by 
FEMA: 
In 1968, Congress created the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) in response to the rising cost of 
taxpayer funded disaster relief for flood victims and the 
increasing amount of damage caused by floods. 
 
 . . . Nearly 20,000 communities across the United States 
and its territories participate in the NFIP by adopting 
and enforcing floodplain management ordinances to 
reduce future flood damage.  In exchange, the NFIP 
makes federally backed flood insurance available to 
homeowners, renters, and business owners in these 
communities. 162 
Flood insurance presents a tricky set of problems.163  If it is priced 
too high, people simply may fail to insure.  If it is priced too low, society 
is in effect subsidizing individuals to build in high-risk areas.  
Obviously, the solution is to price it “just right”—but finding the right 
level may not be easy, especially since there is no private market to use 
as a benchmark.  Moreover, communities have not always followed 
through on promises to control development in flood plains—recall from 
Part I that California has found it necessary to create a liability threat in 
order to motivate better floodplain planning. 
                                                 
162 FEMA, About Flood Insurance, available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease. 
fema?id=18921. 
163 For fuller discussion of issues relating to flood insurance, see DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM 
CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 178–84 (2006); Edward Pasterick, 
The National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE:  THE STATUS AND ROLE OF 
INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (Howard Kunreuther & 
Richard J. Roth eds., 1998). 
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Private insurance for catastrophic risks also presents distinctive 
issues.164  As Steve Sugarman explains: 
 . . . Indeed, it is precisely the dramatically large event 
that leads to widespread disastrous consequences that is 
frequently specifically excluded from certain standard 
private insurance policies.  For example, the destruction 
of one’s home or other buildings is generally not 
covered by ordinary property insurance (or 
homeowners’) policies if the harm is caused by things 
like war, nuclear radiation, floods, and, at least in some 
places, earthquakes.165 
Demand for such insurance may be low because people misjudge the 
likelihood of low-probability events; they may also prefer to incur larger 
                                                 
164 For more in-depth coverage of issues relating to private insurance, see Dwight M. 
Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Terrorism Rethinking the Government's Role Insurance, in ISSUES IN 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, CATASTROPHIC RISKS: PREVENTION, COMPENSATION, AND RECOVERY 
(2007): Article 5, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art5; Howard Kunreuther, 
Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: 
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard 
Kunreuther eds., 2006); HOWARD KUNREUTHER AND RICHARD J. ROTH, SR., PAYING THE 
PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1998).  
165 Sugarman, supra note 145, at 6 (footnote omitted).  Sugarman explains some of the 
reasons why private insurers may be reluctant to enter this market: 
First of all, they find themselves unable to sensibly price the insurance, 
both because the precipitating event too infrequently occurs and when 
it does the amount harm it will cause is not really predictable.   
Moreover, it is especially worrying to insurers that the catastrophe 
might occur markedly earlier than expected, so that not enough 
premiums would yet have been accumulated, thereby putting an 
insurer at risk of insolvency. Even if the timing and scale of the risk 
were reasonably predictable, however, insuring against infrequent 
disasters would require a long accumulation and investment of 
premium income in a way that is not altogether attractive to insurers 
(and re-insurers who might be enticed to spread the risk beyond the 
insurer who initially sold coverage to its customers). Among other 
things, U.S. tax law rules discourage insurance lines that involve 
premium collection without payouts, even if funds are set aside for 
eventual losses. Besides, when the gigantic-loss event finally occurs, 
insurers could be swamped by the claims-handling process, having to 
rely on out-of-area and/or inexperienced staff who are likely to be 
more costly and less efficient. As a result, catastrophic risk coverage 
might simply be an unattractive product for mainstream insurers to 
offer.   
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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uncertain losses than smaller, but more certain, ones.166  The insurance 
industry seems reluctant to provide coverage for large-scale natural 
disasters.  This reluctance may be in part because of the difficulty of 
assessing risk levels,167 as well as the underwriting costs associated with 
maintaining large levels of reserve or reinsurance, not to mention 
competition from various government-subsidized schemes.168 
The federal flood insurance program is based in part on the 
reluctance of the private market to provide such insurance on a broad 
scale.  To fill similar gaps in insurance coverage, state governments have 
also sometimes stepped in.  For instance, in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Andrew, Florida established a backup fund for individuals who could 
not get private coverage, funded by assessments of insurers.  (This bears 
some resemblance to the more familiar “designated risk” pool for car 
insurance.)  The number of policy holders dropped by over ninety 
percent in just a few years, but the remaining coverage still represented 
over ten billion dollars in exposure.  Florida also offers reinsurance to 
private insurers at subsidized rates.169  These solutions, however, are not 
entirely satisfactory:  
Private losses from catastrophes in the United States 
have been rising faster than premiums, population, and 
economic activity, and are correlated with a rising rate of 
impairments, or conditions where insurers’ liabilities 
exceed their assets.  In Florida and Louisiana alone, 
more than 600,000 homeowners’ property policies were 
cancelled or not renewed in 2005. The U.S. residual 
markets – state-mandated pools where commercial 
markets otherwise fail – contain about three million 
customers today, and the number is rising.  If the 
situation is left unchecked, even more of the burden will 
shift to consumers and governments and growth of the 
insurance sector itself could be slowed.170 
                                                 
166 Faure, supra note 146, at 346. 
167 Id. at 348. 
168 For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann 
O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging 
Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1821–33 (2007) (stressing the difficulty of 
quantifying risks as an explanation). 
169 For discussion of the Florida programs, see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 10, at 345–47.  
170 Christina Ross, Evan Mills, & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse: 
Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 26A STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 251, 257 (2007).  See also Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, Facing Mother 
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The government has also supported insurance for terrorism risks.  
For instance, in Britain and Holland, the government provides 
reinsurance for terrorism risks.171  The German government covers losses 
from three billion euros up to ten billion.172  Before 9/11, private 
insurance for terrorist risks was commonly available, but private 
insurers then withdrew from the market.  (By 2003, property and 
business interruption insurance claims filed as a result of 9/11 had 
reached almost $20 billion.173)  As a result, the federal government 
became a reinsurer via the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002.174  
Whether this reinsurance function is desirable is far from clear. 
The upshot of all of this is that private insurance markets do not 
operate well, and may not operate at all, for catastrophic risks.  
Government interventions have had some success in keeping insurance 
markets operative with the help of implicit subsidies such as government 
reinsurance.  But we do not know how to create a truly satisfactory, 
efficient, and equitable mechanism for insuring against catastrophic 
risks. 
In this setting, the risk-spreading function of tort law attains 
heightened importance.  If private firms have tort liability, the burden is 
put on the shareholders and thereby spread through the securities 
markets.  If government agencies have tort liability, the burden is put on 
the taxpayers and again shared widely.  To the extent that private 
insurers are in the market, the burden of covering catastrophic risks can 
be reduced if they are allowed to subrogate to the tort claims of their 
insureds.  In any event, to a much greater extent than is true of more 
easily insurable risks, such as routine auto accidents or house fires, the 
tort system’s ability to spread risks is a major advantage. 
The importance of catastrophe liability as a means of risk spreading 
also counters the argument that we should avoid placing crushing 
burdens on organizations.  This may be true in other circumstances 
because there are superior ways of distributing risks.  But in the case of 
catastrophic risks, satisfactory alternatives may not exist, and liability 
can allow society to tap the unmatched ability of the securities markets 
to spread risk broadly. 
Some may fear that this liability will push businesses into 
bankruptcy.  Although bankruptcy poses risks to stakeholders, such as 
                                                                                                             
Nature, REG. 28, 32 (Fall 2007) (“Writing homeowners insurance in Florida has been a losing 
proposition that is getting worse, not better.”). 
171 See Faure, supra note 146, at 357. 
172 See id. 
173 See Rabin & Bratis, supra note 10, at 326. 
174 See id. at 325. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/4
2009] Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change 1123 
employees, the bankruptcy laws do allow otherwise viable business 
entities to reorganize and continue operation, protecting employees and 
other stakeholders.  Shareholder value may be wiped out, but 
shareholders have access to the biggest risk spreading mechanism in 
human history:  modern international financial markets.  They can hold 
diversified stock portfolios or otherwise hedge against risk.  (As recent 
events in the financial markets indicate, this form of risk-spreading is not 
absolutely foolproof, but it works well except in the case of rare financial 
meltdowns—and during meltdowns, the added risk from potential 
corporate tort liability is trivial compared with the losses from market 
fluctuations.)  Thus, transferring risk to shareholders from disaster 
victims is not something that we should fear.  The risk that third-parties 
such as employees may be harmed by bankruptcy should not be 
dismissed, but we should not confuse the need to protect such innocent 
parties with the interests of shareholders who are often in a much better 
position to diversify risks than the victims of catastrophic risks. 
In sum, imposing liability for catastrophic risks can serve the goals of 
deterring undesirable conduct and can also reinforce society’s otherwise 
limited ability to spread the costs of catastrophe through private or 
governmental insurance.  Because the important defendants will nearly 
always be organizations, the applicability of corrective justice depends 
on our willingness to hold stakeholders, such as current shareholders or 
taxpayers, responsible for the sins of the organization. 
IV.  NAVIGATING THE PITFALLS:  JUDICIAL COMPETENCE, MANAGEABILITY, 
AND PROOF 
The asbestos cases are all the warning we could ask of the difficulties 
that catastrophic risks can pose for the judicial system.  Improvements in 
civil procedure may ameliorate these difficulties, but we should also 
consider other possible options.  One option is to move compensation 
away from the judiciary to an administrative agency; another is to craft 
liability rules that reduce manageability issues.  Even if an 
administrative system would be better than processing claims through 
case-by-case litigation, judicial liability may be better than nothing and 
may actually be a stepping stone toward an administrative or quasi-
administrative system.  Judicial findings of liability could lead to the 
establishment of an administrative compensation scheme, either by 
creating pressure for legislative action or by leading a court to create 
some quasi-administrative mechanism with which to provide class relief 
in the remedy phase. 
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A. Administrative Compensation Schemes 
The desirability of compensation does not necessarily mean that a 
judicial forum is optimal.  A legislatively established administrative 
system might offer several advantages over courts.175  It could operate 
under a more comprehensive set of rules.  Transaction costs could be 
lower because agency expertise would produce more efficient decisions.  
It might also be easier for an agency to produce standardized protocols 
and payment schedules, which would also simplify the adjudicatory 
process.176 
Although some features of the system were unique, the 9/11 fund 
provides one model of an administrative compensation scheme.177  Such 
schemes provide a mechanism for social risk-spreading.  Where the 
government is in part to blame for an event, such schemes may also 
                                                 
175 See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative 
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993) for a discussion of the issues involved in 
designing such a system.    
176 The ABA has recommended the use of administrative compensation, but largely as a 
back-up for judicial remedies rather than a substitute: 
Government payment of compensation or additional assistance to 
persons affected by a major disaster should be considered when 
government is either implicated in the major disaster or public 
authorities determine that it is in the public interest to do so.  Principles 
of equal treatment, due process and transparency should govern the 
distribution of compensation and disaster assistance. 
American Bar Association, Rule of Law in Times of Major Disaster, Principle 7 (2007), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ruleoflaw/rol_disaster.pdf.  The 
commentary explains: 
 In cases where neither insurance coverage nor judicial action is 
likely to provide reimbursement for losses to persons affected by a 
major disaster, public authorities should consider providing 
reasonable compensation or additional disaster assistance to 
individual persons affected by a major disaster for losses when public 
authorities determine that it is in the public interest to do so, for 
example, where public authorities are responsible, through their action 
or inaction, for the disaster event or where public authorities 
determine that a remedy traditionally available either through the 
operation of the judicial system or otherwise should not be made 
available or should be severely curtailed.  In such cases public 
authorities may provide for alternatives to judicial action to determine 
eligibility and fix awards.  Public authorities should also be free to 
offer to persons affected by a major disaster, on a voluntary basis, a fair 
alternative to judicial action for the resolution of claims or the award of 
assistance. 
Id. 
177 For a recent appraisal of the fund, see Robert L. Rabin & Stephen Sugarman, The Case 
for Specially Compensating the Victims of Terrorist Acts: An Assessment, available at 
ssrn.com/abstract=1097674. 
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provide a form of corrective justice, at least if we believe that the 
citizenry should take responsibility for the actions of their agents.  On 
the other hand, an administrative compensation system would not 
penalize negligence by private parties who failed to take precautions 
against terrorism or other catastrophic events.  Thus, an administrative 
system is best at risk-spreading, but not so good at deterrence or 
corrective justice unless the cost is shifted to the culpable parties. 
Climate change might provide one setting for an administrative 
solution.  In a previous article, I suggested the following possible 
scheme.178  A commission would receive claims from countries that have 
incurred adaptation expenses, such as strengthening sea walls or 
providing alternative sources of ecosystem services to replace lost 
wetlands.  The commission would determine which adaptation expenses 
were reasonable, and would schedule them for compensation.  
Compensation might come directly from an international fund, but an 
alternative payment system might be more appealing if an international 
trading system for greenhouse gases was in place.  In this alternative 
way of financing compensation, a set number of greenhouse gas 
allowances could be set aside for the commission’s use.  The commission 
would use these allowances to pay claims; in turn, the claimants could 
sell them to greenhouse gas emitters on the open market.  The net effect 
would be that the sources doing the least to reduce their emission levels, 
which would have the greatest need to purchase additional emission 
permits, would indirectly provide compensation for the expenses of 
adaptation.   
If an administrative compensation public risk is desired, should 
there be a permanent scheme for compensating public risks, or should ad 
hoc schemes be established after the fact?  There are several arguments 
in favor of permanent compensation schemes providing umbrella 
coverage (or at least a default framework) for catastrophic risks.  One 
argument for a permanent umbrella scheme is equity between victims.  
For example, the German government provided up to 8.1 billion euros in 
compensation for victims of a flood, but failed to provide similar 
compensation for victims of other disasters.179  Special funds were 
established in the Netherlands following a disease outbreak, a fire in a 
bar, and an explosion in a fireworks facility, with different procedures 
and levels of compensation for each of the three funds.180  Similarly, it 
seems unjust that the 9/11 victims had the right to obtain government 
                                                 
178 See Farber, supra note 85. 
179 See Faure, supra note 146, at 353. 
180 See id. at 356. 
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compensation, but not the victims of the Oklahoma City terrorist 
bombing.   
Moreover, establishing a permanent scheme avoids the need for 
political wrangling about compensation after each event.  Even if new 
legislation is required, having an established default scheme provides a 
framework for bargaining and should streamline consideration of 
legislative changes to deal with a particular catastrophic event. 
On the other hand, the ex ante assurance of government 
compensation is clearly fatal to any possible private insurance market—
as one scholar has said, “Solidarity kills market insurance.”181  Whether 
this is a serious problem depends on whether a viable insurance market 
is actually possible.  But, as seen earlier, it is not clear whether private 
insurance markets for public risks are viable anyway.  Advance 
assurance of compensation may also encourage forms of moral hazard, 
such as building in high-risk areas.  Thus, a government compensation 
scheme may need to be coupled with some form of risk regulation or 
funded through risk-adjusted premiums.   
As a practical matter, it may be difficult to establish a permanent 
compensation system for political reasons, and also because public risks 
vary so much in their characteristics.  A compensation system for 
earthquakes would look very different from a compensation system for 
climate change.  Ad hoc administrative systems remain a possibility.  
Their drawbacks are their unequal treatment of victims of different 
public risks and the potential for interest group influence on their 
formulation and implementation.   
Litigation may have problems of its own, but does not suffer from 
these defects.  Moreover, without the threat of litigation, the impetus for 
a legislative solution may not exist.  Thus, initial resort to the courts may 
be a catalyst for a more satisfactory long-term solution, and may, in any 
event, be the only practical route for victims. 
B. The Feasibility of Judicial Remedies 
But can courts handle these cases?  The manageability of claims 
depends in part on substantive law rather than procedure.  Thus, we 
should consider how to shape liability rules for catastrophic risks that 
are both defensible on their own terms and conducive to effective 
procedural resolution.  It is clear that much more work needs to be done 
in this realm, but a few preliminary thoughts are in order. 
To begin, there should be a general presumption in favor of 
preventive relief, as exemplified by medical monitoring or removal of 
                                                 
181 Id. at 353 (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
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hazardous substances.  This form of relief has three key advantages.  
First, it obviates the need to engage in difficult individualized inquiries 
into whether individualized harms were caused by the defendant’s 
conduct.  Second, it does not raise the specter of unlimited, uninsurable 
liability for defendants, because preventive efforts are more easily 
forecast and generally lower than the ultimate damage to individuals 
that would result without precautions.  Third, because preventive 
measures will be taken sooner, continuity of ownership is likely to be 
greater.  At the time preventive measures are required, more of the 
stakeholders will have benefited from, or contributed to, the wrongful 
conduct, as opposed to the situation some years later, when catastrophic 
harm might typically eventuate. 
Furthermore, when limiting the class of victims is necessary for 
manageability and fairness, the first priority should be the victims with 
the most catastrophic losses.  This point is based on the significance of 
catastrophic risk liability as a form of risk-spreading, and it is those with 
the most severe harms who are most in need of insurance.  Given 
equivalent losses, poorer individuals are more in need of insurance than 
richer ones.  Thus, the families of the deceased, and individuals facing a 
risk of death, should recover before those with property losses or less 
drastic health effects.  Similarly, those whose property is destroyed 
should get higher priority than those who suffer a lesser diminution in 
value.  And losses that are otherwise covered by the insurance system 
should have lower priority than those that are not. 
We should also favor claims where the causal connection applies 
generally to a class of victims, versus situations where the causal 
connection is highly individualized.  The reason is obvious in terms of 
procedural manageability. 
Turning from the plaintiffs to the defendants, courts should also be 
more inclined to impose liability for catastrophic risks where the 
defendants were negligent, or at least where the danger was known to 
them.  This is important for deterrence purposes; it also bolsters 
whatever argument for corrective justice may apply.  This should not be 
an absolute bar to stricter forms of liability, particularly when there are 
many individual defendants and it would be difficult or impossible to 
assess their individual culpability.  It may also make sense to shift the 
burden of proof regarding culpability or liability shares to the 
defendants in order to expedite the litigation. 
Under the best of circumstances, liability claims involving billions of 
dollars will pose challenges to judges and litigants.  Procedural 
innovations can help, and so can sensitivity to manageability concerns in 
crafting liability rules.  Manageability may sometimes require curtailing 
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the class of victims or the form of relief, though courts should not jump 
to the conclusion without careful consideration of potential procedural 
solutions.  In any event, manageability should rarely provide a 
justification for blanket immunity to entities that are responsible for 
causing catastrophic losses to others. 
One of the positive lessons of the Strauss case is that we are not faced 
with an all-or-nothing choice.  It may not be feasible to compensate all 
victims of catastrophic risks.  Perhaps they are difficult to identify, or 
their damages are hard to assess, or their numbers would overwhelm the 
judicial system’s procedural capacities, or the burden of liability would 
fall unfairly on innocent parties.  Nevertheless, the unavailability of full 
compensation does not mean that all compensation should be denied.  
Strauss created a kind of triage rule, identifying a subclass of victims 
(those in privity of contract with the utility) whose claims seemed 
particularly deserving to the court.  Although this truncation of the 
compensated group may not have been warranted, it does at least 
establish the possibility of cutting potentially unmanageable cases down 
to size.  Providing partial relief to only some victims is not ideal, but it is 
better than providing zero relief to any victims. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In tort law, “big” is not necessarily “bad.”  The scale of litigation is 
not by itself a reason for courts to flinch.  As the Restatement observes, 
“courts must be sensitive to the fact that some tortuous conduct may 
threaten, in a very clear way, massive harm and that merely the fact that 
the scope of liability is huge is not, of itself, a ground for imposing limits 
on it.”182  We have seen that there may be good reasons for imposing 
                                                 
182 Restatement (Third) of Torts, supra note 69, at 599 (§ 29, comment m).  The Strauss case 
is ironic in this respect: 
At base, the court feared that requiring compensation of all victims 
could bankrupt the company, disrupt its operations, and quite possibly 
result in the denial of the public of its basic need for electricity. This is 
an instance in which, had there merely been a single victim who was 
not a Con Edison customer (for example, a tenant whose electricity is 
paid for by the landlord), then (under the same facts) that victim 
clearly would have been able to recover compensation from the utility. 
Rather perversely, then, the fact that so many were harmed was what 
allowed the defendant to escape legal responsibility. (A different 
justification for this result might be that, when catastrophic results 
occur, if the defendant has to pay for all of the foreseeable 
consequences of its misconduct, this would be excessive 
“punishment.” Yet, tort law normally does not require any relationship 
between the degree of fault and the amount of liability.) 
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liability for catastrophic events on businesses or governments in terms of 
deterrence, risk-spreading, and perhaps to a lesser extent, corrective 
justice. 
Too often, I believe, students leave their introductory tort courses 
with the sense that tort law is mostly a subject for personal injury 
lawyers and insurance companies, having little bearing on broader social 
problems.  Providing compensation for victims of accidents, defective 
products, and malpractice is an important social goal, as is safeguarding 
valuable social activities against excessive liability.  Thus, “everyday” 
tort law is important to society, not just to particular segments of the bar.  
In this sense, tort law is part of public law, not merely concerned with 
settling disputes between individuals fairly.183   
But the significance of tort law is even broader.  More importantly 
still, I believe, tort law can be relevant to some of the largest and most 
dramatic issues facing our society.  Of course, tort law is not the only tool 
we have to use against threats such as terrorism, public health hazards, 
and climate change.  It is not even the most important tool.  
Nevertheless, it can be a key part of our toolkit for responding to 
catastrophic risks. 
                                                                                                             
Sugarman, supra note 165, at 10–11.  The courts’ fear of bankrupting the company maybe 
excessive since Chapter 11 is designed to allow companies to continue operations and 
reorganize; in addition, bankruptcy risks are easily diversified through the securities 
markets.  This is not to say bankruptcy poses no risks, and clearly innocent parties, such as 
workers or other creditors, may be harmed.   
183 This public law perspective on torts, I believe, is the fundamental lesson of Guido 
Calabresi’s classic Cost of Accidents, although it is probably remembered more often for 
introducing economic analysis into tort law. 
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